

CLAT Legal Reasoning

Sample Paper – 3

Duration: 30 Minutes

Maximum Marks: 30

Instructions

- This paper contains **30** Multiple Choice Questions (Single Correct Answer), modelled on the Legal Reasoning section of **CLAT** (Common Law Admission Test).
- Each correct answer carries **+1 mark**. There is a **negative marking of 0.25 marks** for every incorrect answer; unattempted questions carry no penalty.
- The paper has **five passages**, each stating one or more **legal principles** and followed by **six** questions. Apply **only** the principle(s) given in the passage to the facts; do not rely on any outside knowledge of the law.
- CLAT is an offline pen-and-paper (OMR) test with no sectional time limit; attempt this practice paper in one timed sitting of about **30 minutes**.
- Use of mobile phones, calculators, dictionaries, or electronic gadgets is strictly prohibited.

Passage I

Directions (Q1–Q6): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: Defamation is the publication of a statement that lowers a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society, or exposes him to hatred, ridicule or contempt. To be actionable the statement must be defamatory, must refer to the person complaining, and must be *published*, that is, communicated to at least one person other than the person defamed.

A statement made only to the person himself, and to nobody else, is not published and is not actionable. *Truth* is a complete defence: a true statement, however damaging, is



not actionable. A *fair comment*, made honestly on a matter of public interest and based on true facts, is also a defence. Mere abuse spoken in anger, which no one takes as a statement of fact, is not defamation.

- Q1.** A writes a letter to many people falsely stating that B, a shopkeeper, cheats his customers with false weights. B's reputation suffers as a result. Applying the principle, is this defamation?
- (A) No, because A merely wrote a private letter.
 - (B) Yes, because A published to others a false statement that lowers B in their estimation.
 - (C) No, because a shopkeeper cannot be defamed at all.
 - (D) Yes, but only if B can show he actually lost customers.
- Q2.** A says a false and damaging thing about C directly to C's face, with absolutely no one else present to hear it. Applying the principle, is this actionable defamation?
- (A) No, because the statement was made only to C and was never published to anyone else.
 - (B) Yes, because the statement was false and hurtful to C.
 - (C) Yes, because C himself heard the statement.
 - (D) No, because spoken words can never amount to defamation.
- Q3.** A newspaper truthfully reports, with proof, that D was convicted of fraud last year. D sues, admitting the report is true but saying it harms him. Applying the principle, is it actionable?
- (A) Yes, actionable, because the report harms D's reputation.
 - (B) Yes, actionable, because a newspaper must stay silent about a person's past.
 - (C) Not actionable, because the statement is true, and truth is a complete defence.
 - (D) Not actionable, because newspapers are always immune from suit.



- Q4.** During a heated quarrel A loudly calls B “a donkey and a fool” in front of others, and everyone present understands it as angry abuse rather than a statement of fact. Applying the principle, is this defamation?
- (A) Yes, because other people heard the insult.
- (B) Yes, because the words used were rude and hurtful.
- (C) No, because B suffered no physical harm from the words.
- (D) No, because it was mere abuse spoken in anger that no one took as a statement of fact.
- Q5.** A film critic, honestly and on true facts, writes that a publicly released film is “poorly directed and badly acted” as his opinion of it. The director sues him. Applying the principle, is there a defence?
- (A) Not actionable, because it is fair comment made honestly, on a matter of public interest, based on true facts.
- (B) Actionable, because the review of the film is negative.
- (C) Actionable, because a critic must praise every film he watches.
- (D) Not actionable, because a film simply cannot be reviewed in public.
- Q6.** A tells a false story to a crowd that E, whom he names clearly, is a thief. E is a respected man, and the crowd now distrusts him. Applying the principle, is this defamation?
- (A) No, because A was only telling a story to a crowd.
- (B) No, because E should himself prove that he is not a thief.
- (C) Yes, but only if E is actually arrested afterwards.
- (D) Yes, because A published to others a false statement clearly identifying E that lowers him in their estimation.

Passage II

Directions (Q7–Q12): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.



Principle: A person who has not completed 18 years of age is a *minor*. A minor is not competent to contract, and an agreement made by a minor is *void from the very beginning*. Being void, such an agreement cannot be enforced against the minor, and the minor cannot be compelled to perform it, nor can he be made to repay, as a contractual debt, money lent to him under it.

However, a person who supplies a minor with *necessaries* of life (such as food, clothing, or essential medical aid) suited to the minor's condition may be reimbursed, not out of any contract, but from the minor's property, if the minor has any. A minor may be a *beneficiary*: he can accept benefits under an arrangement, though he cannot be bound as a promisor.

- Q7.** A, aged 16, agrees to buy B's motorcycle on credit and later refuses to pay. B sues to enforce the agreement against A. Applying the principle, can he?
- (A) Yes, because A did agree to buy the motorcycle.
 - (B) No, because A is a minor, and an agreement made by a minor is void from the beginning and cannot be enforced against him.
 - (C) Yes, because the motorcycle was delivered to A.
 - (D) No, because a motorcycle cannot be sold on credit at all.
- Q8.** A moneylender lends money to C, aged 17, under a loan agreement. C does not repay. Applying the principle, can the lender recover it from C as a contractual debt?
- (A) No, because C is a minor and the loan agreement is void, so it cannot be enforced against him as a contract.
 - (B) Yes, because C did take the money.
 - (C) Yes, because a loan must always be repaid whatever the borrower's age.
 - (D) No, because a moneylender may never lend money to anyone.
- Q9.** A trader supplies essential food and clothing, suited to his needs, to D, a minor who has inherited property. D does not pay. Applying the principle, can the trader be reimbursed from D's property?



- (A) No, because D is a minor and owes nothing at all.
- (B) No, because a trader cannot deal with a minor in any way.
- (C) Yes, because necessaries suited to a minor may be reimbursed from the minor's property.
- (D) Yes, but only if D promises again to pay after turning 18.

Q10. E, a minor, is made the beneficiary of a promissory note under which money is payable to E. The debtor refuses to pay, arguing that E is a minor. Applying the principle, can E enforce the benefit?

- (A) No, because a minor can do nothing at all in law.
- (B) No, because a minor is not allowed to handle money.
- (C) Yes, but only after E turns 25 years of age.
- (D) Yes, because a minor may be a beneficiary and accept benefits, though he cannot be bound as a promisor.

Q11. F, aged 15, agrees to sell his bicycle to G and takes an advance, then refuses to deliver it. G sues to compel F to deliver the bicycle. Applying the principle, can he?

- (A) Yes, because F took an advance from G.
- (B) Yes, because a promise once made must always be kept.
- (C) No, because F is a minor and cannot be compelled to perform a void agreement.
- (D) No, because a bicycle is a necessary of life.

Q12. H, aged 17, falsely tells a seller he is 20, and on that basis buys goods on credit, then refuses to pay. The seller sues on the agreement. Applying the principle, can he enforce it against H?

- (A) No, because H is in fact a minor, so the agreement is void and cannot be enforced against him as a contract.
- (B) Yes, because H lied about his age to the seller.
- (C) Yes, because a person who lies must always be made to pay.



- (D) No, because goods sold on credit can never be recovered from anyone.

Passage III

Directions (Q13–Q18): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: Culpable homicide is the causing of death by an act done with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.

Culpable homicide becomes the graver offence of *murder* when the act is done with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing an injury that the offender knows to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. But culpable homicide is *not* murder if the offender, while deprived of the power of self-control by *grave and sudden provocation*, causes the death of the person who gave that provocation. Where death is caused by a pure accident, with no intention and no knowledge of any likelihood of death, it is neither culpable homicide nor murder.

- Q13.** X, intending to kill Y, shoots Y through the heart, and Y dies. Applying the principle, which is it?
- (A) Neither, because it was an accident.
- (B) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder only.
- (C) Murder, because the act was done with the intention of causing death.
- (D) No offence at all.
- Q14.** In a quarrel X gives Y a hard push, meaning no more than that, without intending to kill and without knowing it likely to kill. Y unexpectedly falls, strikes his head and dies. Assume no intention to cause death or dangerous injury, and no knowledge that death was likely. Applying the principle, which is it?
- (A) Murder, because Y in fact died.
- (B) Neither culpable homicide nor murder, because there was no intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death, and no knowledge that death was likely.



- (C) Murder, because giving a push is a dangerous act.
- (D) Culpable homicide amounting to murder.

Q15. Z suddenly insults and slaps X, and X, deprived of self-control by that grave and sudden provocation, at once strikes Z and kills him. Applying the principle, which is it?

- (A) Murder, because X killed Z.
- (B) No offence at all, because X was provoked.
- (C) An accident, with no offence.
- (D) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder, because X acted while deprived of self-control by grave and sudden provocation from Z.

Q16. X stabs Y in the stomach with a large knife, intending to cause an injury that X knows to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and Y dies. Applying the principle, which is it?

- (A) Murder, because the injury was intended and known to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
- (B) Neither, because X did not aim at the heart.
- (C) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder only.
- (D) No offence at all.

Q17. X fires a gun into the air in celebration in a lonely field, believing no one is near and having no knowledge of any risk to life. A hidden person is struck and dies. Assume no intention and no knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. Applying the principle, which is it?

- (A) Murder, because a gun was used.
- (B) Culpable homicide amounting to murder.
- (C) Neither culpable homicide nor murder, because there was no intention and no knowledge that the act was likely to cause death.
- (D) Murder, simply because a person died.



- Q18.** X, knowing that rolling a heavy stone down a crowded street is likely to cause death, does exactly that, and a person is killed. Assume he had knowledge that the act was likely to cause death, though no intention to kill any particular person. Applying the principle, which is it?
- (A) No offence, because he did not name a victim.
 - (B) An accident, with no offence.
 - (C) Neither, because he never touched the victim.
 - (D) Culpable homicide, because he acted with the knowledge that his act was likely to cause death.

Passage IV

Directions (Q19–Q24): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. Equality does not mean that every person must be treated exactly alike; it forbids only unjustified discrimination between persons who are similarly placed.

The State may classify persons into groups and treat them differently, but only if the classification passes two tests together. First, it must rest on an *intelligible differentia*, a real and understandable difference that marks off those grouped together from those left out. Second, that differentia must have a *rational nexus*, a reasonable connection, with the object the law seeks to achieve. A classification that is arbitrary, or that bears no rational connection to the law's object, is invalid. This right is available to every person.

- Q19.** A law gives free medical care to persons below the poverty line, and not to the rich. A rich person complains that this denies him equality. Applying the principle, is the classification valid?
- (A) Invalid, because every person must be treated exactly alike in all things.
 - (B) Valid, because the classification by poverty rests on a real difference with a rational connection to the aim of helping the needy.
 - (C) Invalid, because the rich are left out of the benefit.
 - (D) Valid, because the State may simply do whatever it likes.



- Q20.** A law names one particular trader and taxes only him heavily, for no reason connected to any policy, while all other identical traders are left untaxed. Applying the principle, is it valid?
- (A) Valid, because the State can choose whom to tax.
 - (B) Valid, because the named trader is a wealthy man.
 - (C) Invalid, because singling out one trader for no reason is arbitrary and rests on no intelligible differentia.
 - (D) Invalid, because all taxes are inherently unfair.
- Q21.** A law allows only trained doctors, and not untrained persons, to perform surgery. An untrained person claims this denies him equality. Applying the principle, is the classification valid?
- (A) Invalid, because every person must be allowed to operate.
 - (B) Invalid, because it unfairly favours doctors.
 - (C) Valid, because the State may act just as it pleases.
 - (D) Valid, because distinguishing trained doctors rests on a real difference with a rational connection to patient safety.
- Q22.** A law classifies factories by the number of workers and applies stricter safety rules to larger factories, to protect a greater number of workers. A large-factory owner objects. Applying the principle, is it valid?
- (A) Valid, because the classification by factory size has a rational connection to protecting a larger number of workers.
 - (B) Invalid, because all factories must be treated identically.
 - (C) Invalid, because larger factories are being singled out.
 - (D) Valid, because factory owners have no rights of their own.
- Q23.** A law grants a special benefit only to persons born in the month of March, with no connection whatever between the month of birth and the purpose of the benefit. Applying the principle, is the classification valid?
- (A) Valid, because a line has to be drawn somewhere.



- (B) Valid, because a month is a clear and definite division.
- (C) Invalid, because the month of birth bears no rational connection to the object of the benefit.
- (D) Invalid, because every benefit is bound to be unequal.

Q24. A rule sets aside separate hospital wards for patients with a highly infectious disease, in order to stop the infection spreading to others. A patient objects to being separated. Applying the principle, is the classification valid?

- (A) Invalid, because all patients must share the very same ward.
- (B) Valid, because separating patients with an infectious disease has a rational connection to preventing its spread.
- (C) Invalid, because any separation of people is discrimination.
- (D) Valid, because hospitals are free to ignore equality.

Passage V

Directions (Q25–Q30): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: A person who, for his own purposes, brings onto his land and keeps there anything likely to do harm if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril. If it escapes and causes harm, he is liable for the damage *even without any negligence* on his part. This is strict liability.

It applies only where there is a *non-natural use* of land (a special use bringing increased danger, not an ordinary use) and an *escape* of the dangerous thing from the defendant's land. The liability is subject to exceptions: there is no liability where the escape was caused solely by the *act of a stranger* over whom the defendant had no control, or by an *act of God* (a natural event so extraordinary that no human foresight could guard against it), or by the *plaintiff's own fault*, or where the thing was kept with the plaintiff's consent.

Q25. A stores a huge mass of water in a large reservoir on his land to run his mill. Without any negligence the reservoir bursts and floods B's mine. Applying the principle, is A liable under strict liability?

- (A) No, because A was not negligent in any way.



- (B) Yes, because A brought and kept a large mass of water, a non-natural use, which escaped and caused harm, so he is liable even without negligence.
- (C) No, because water is a natural substance.
- (D) Yes, but only if A intended the flood to happen.

Q26. A keeps ordinary quantities of water in the domestic pipes of his flat for household use. Without any negligence a pipe leaks and damages the flat below. Applying the principle, is there strict liability?

- (A) Yes, because water escaped and caused harm.
- (B) Yes, because A kept water on his premises.
- (C) No, because ordinary domestic water pipes are a natural use of land, not a non-natural one.
- (D) No, because water can never give rise to any liability.

Q27. A keeps a dangerous store of explosives on his land, a non-natural use. A stranger, over whom A has no control, deliberately sets them off, and they escape and injure B. Applying the principle, is A liable under strict liability?

- (A) Yes, because the explosives were dangerous things.
- (B) Yes, because they were kept on A's land.
- (C) No, but only because A himself was not negligent.
- (D) No, because the escape was caused solely by the deliberate act of a stranger over whom A had no control.

Q28. A collects a large mass of dangerous chemicals, a non-natural use. They escape only because of an utterly extraordinary and unforeseeable natural cataclysm that no human foresight could have guarded against, harming B. Applying the principle, is A liable?

- (A) No, because the escape was caused solely by an act of God that no human foresight could have guarded against.



- (B) Yes, because chemicals are dangerous.
- (C) Yes, because the chemicals were kept by A.
- (D) No, because storing chemicals is a natural use of land.

Q29. A stores a large volume of gas, a non-natural use. It escapes and harms B, but only because B himself, without permission, broke open the sealed store. Applying the principle, is A liable?

- (A) Yes, because the gas did escape and cause harm.
- (B) No, because the escape was caused by B's own fault in breaking open the store.
- (C) Yes, because A was the one who kept the gas.
- (D) No, because keeping gas is a natural use of land.

Q30. A keeps a large industrial tank of acid on his land, a non-natural use. With no negligence, and with no exception applying, the acid escapes and burns B's crops. Applying the principle, is A liable under strict liability?

- (A) No, because A took care of the tank.
- (B) No, because acid is much like water.
- (C) Yes, because the dangerous acid, a non-natural use, escaped and caused harm, so A is strictly liable even without negligence.
- (D) Yes, but only if A meant to harm B's crops.



Detailed Solutions

Q1.

Solution

Principle applied: A defamatory statement that refers to a person and is published to others is defamation.

Application to the facts: The letter falsely accuses B of cheating with false weights, which lowers him in others' estimation, so it is defamatory. It clearly refers to B. A wrote it to many people, so it was published. All three requirements are met.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Writing a letter to others is a form of publication, not a shield.
- Option C: A shopkeeper can certainly be defamed.
- Option D: Defamation does not require proof of actual lost customers.

Final Answer: Defamatory, refers to B, and published \Rightarrow **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q1](#)

Q2.

Solution

Principle applied: A statement made only to the person defamed, and to no one else, is not published and is not actionable.

Application to the facts: A spoke the words directly to C's face. No other person was present or heard them. Since nothing was communicated to a third person, there was no publication. Without publication the statement is not actionable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Falsity and hurt are not enough without publication to a third person.
- Option C: C hearing it about himself is not publication.
- Option D: Spoken words can be defamation; the flaw here is only the lack of publication.

Final Answer: No publication to a third person \Rightarrow **A**

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q2](#)



Q3.

Solution

Principle applied: Truth is a complete defence; a true statement, however damaging, is not actionable.

Application to the facts: The report that D was convicted of fraud is true and proven. D himself admits its truth. Truth is a complete defence under the principle. So the report, though harmful, is not actionable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Harm does not matter once the statement is shown to be true.
- Option B: There is no duty to stay silent about a true past conviction.
- Option D: Newspapers are not “always immune”; here the defence is specifically truth.

Final Answer: True statement, complete defence ⇒

[Go Back to Q3](#)

Q4.

Solution

Principle applied: Mere abuse spoken in anger, which no one takes as a statement of fact, is not defamation.

Application to the facts: A called B “a donkey and a fool” in a heated quarrel. Everyone present understood it as angry abuse, not a factual statement. Abuse that no one treats as a statement of fact does not lower B in a factual sense. So it is not defamation.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Others hearing angry abuse does not make it defamatory.
- Option B: Rudeness alone is not defamation.
- Option C: Physical harm is irrelevant; the point is that the words were mere abuse.

Final Answer: Mere abuse not taken as fact ⇒

[Go Back to Q4](#)



Q5.

Solution

Principle applied: Fair comment, made honestly on a matter of public interest and based on true facts, is a defence.

Application to the facts: A publicly released film is a matter of public interest. The critic honestly gives his opinion, based on the true facts of the film. Calling it poorly directed and badly acted is comment, not a false statement of fact. So the defence of fair comment applies and it is not actionable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: A negative review is protected if it is honest fair comment.
- Option C: A critic is not required to praise a film.
- Option D: Films certainly can be reviewed publicly.

Final Answer: Honest fair comment on a public matter ⇒

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q5](#)

Q6.

Solution

Principle applied: A false, defamatory statement identifying a person and published to others is defamation.

Application to the facts: A falsely brands E a thief, which exposes him to distrust and contempt, so it is defamatory. He names E clearly, so it refers to him. He tells it to a crowd, so it is published. All requirements are met.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Calling it a “story” does not excuse a false, published, defamatory statement.
- Option B: The burden is not on E to prove his innocence of the false charge.
- Option C: Defamation does not require the victim to be arrested.

Final Answer: False, identifying and published statement ⇒

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q6](#)



Q7.

Solution

Principle applied: An agreement made by a minor is void from the beginning and cannot be enforced against him.

Application to the facts: A is 16, so he is a minor. His agreement to buy the motorcycle on credit is void from the start. A void agreement cannot be enforced against the minor. So B cannot enforce it.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A minor agreeing does not create an enforceable contract.
- Option C: Delivery of the motorcycle does not validate a void agreement.
- Option D: Credit sales are generally lawful; the flaw here is A's minority.

Final Answer: Minor's agreement is void \Rightarrow

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q7](#)

Q8.

Solution

Principle applied: A minor cannot be made to repay, as a contractual debt, money lent under a void agreement.

Application to the facts: C is 17, a minor. The loan agreement with him is void. Money lent under a void agreement cannot be recovered from the minor as a contractual debt. So the lender cannot recover it that way.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: That C took the money does not create an enforceable debt against a minor.
- Option C: The blanket idea that every loan must be repaid ignores the minority rule.
- Option D: The point is not that lenders can never lend, but that this loan is void against a minor.

Final Answer: Void loan not recoverable as a contract \Rightarrow

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q8](#)



Q9.

Solution

Principle applied: A supplier of necessaries suited to a minor may be reimbursed from the minor's property.

Application to the facts: The trader supplied essential food and clothing suited to D's needs, which are necessaries. D is a minor but has inherited property. Reimbursement for necessaries comes not from any contract but from the minor's property. So the trader may be reimbursed from D's property.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A minor is not free of all liability; necessaries may be recovered from his property.
- Option B: A trader may supply necessaries to a minor and claim from the minor's property.
- Option D: Reimbursement for necessaries does not depend on a fresh promise after 18.

Final Answer: Necessaries recoverable from the minor's property ⇒

[Go Back to Q9](#)

Q10.

Solution

Principle applied: A minor may be a beneficiary and accept benefits, though he cannot be bound as a promisor.

Application to the facts: The promissory note makes money payable to E. E is only receiving a benefit, not making a promise. The principle allows a minor to be a beneficiary and take benefits. So E can enforce the benefit.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A minor is not barred from everything; he may accept benefits.
- Option B: There is no rule that a minor cannot receive money due to him.
- Option C: No waiting until 25 is required; the benefit is his now.

Final Answer: A minor may take a benefit ⇒

[Go Back to Q10](#)



Q11.

Solution

Principle applied: A minor cannot be compelled to perform a void agreement.

Application to the facts: F is 15, a minor, so his agreement to sell the bicycle is void. Taking an advance does not turn a void agreement into a binding one. A minor cannot be compelled to perform such an agreement. So G cannot compel delivery.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The advance does not make a void agreement enforceable against a minor.
- Option B: The general idea that promises must be kept yields to the minority rule.
- Option D: A bicycle here is being sold, not supplied as a necessary; that idea does not apply.

Final Answer: Minor cannot be compelled to perform ⇒ C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q11](#)

Q12.

Solution

Principle applied: A minor's agreement is void and unenforceable against him, whatever he may have represented about his age.

Application to the facts: H is in fact 17, a minor. The agreement to buy goods on credit is therefore void. The principle makes such an agreement unenforceable against the minor as a contract. So the seller cannot enforce it against H.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: The lie about age does not, under this principle, make the void agreement enforceable as a contract.
- Option C: "A liar must always pay" is not the rule; the agreement remains void.
- Option D: The blanket claim about credit sales is wrong; the real reason is H's minority.

Final Answer: Still a minor, so the agreement is void ⇒ A

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q12](#)



Q13.

Solution

Principle applied: Culpable homicide is murder when the act is done with the intention of causing death.

Application to the facts: X intended to kill Y. He shot Y through the heart, and Y died. An act done with the intention of causing death is murder. So this is murder.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: It was no accident; the killing was intended.
- Option B: With intention to kill, it rises to murder, not the lesser offence.
- Option D: An intentional killing is certainly an offence.

Final Answer: Intention to cause death \Rightarrow

[Go Back to Q13](#)

Q14.

Solution

Principle applied: Where there is no intention to cause death or dangerous injury and no knowledge that death is likely, it is neither culpable homicide nor murder.

Application to the facts: X only meant to push Y in a quarrel. He had no intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. He had no knowledge that death was likely. With none of the required mental states present, it is neither offence.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Death alone does not make it murder without the required intention or knowledge.
- Option C: A mere push is not treated here as carrying knowledge that death was likely.
- Option D: It cannot amount to murder without any intention or the required knowledge.

Final Answer: No intention and no knowledge of likely death \Rightarrow

[Go Back to Q14](#)



Q15.

Solution

Principle applied: Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, deprived of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, kills the person who gave it.

Application to the facts: Z suddenly insulted and slapped X, a grave and sudden provocation. X, deprived of self-control, at once struck and killed Z, the very person who provoked him. This falls within the provocation exception. So it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The provocation exception takes it out of murder.
- Option B: It is not “no offence”; it remains culpable homicide, only not murder.
- Option C: It was not an accident; X struck deliberately, though under provocation.

Final Answer: Grave and sudden provocation exception ⇒ D

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q15](#)

Q16.

Solution

Principle applied: Culpable homicide is murder when the injury is intended and known to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Application to the facts: X stabbed Y in the stomach with a large knife. He intended that injury and knew it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Y died from it. This is murder under the principle.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Not aiming at the heart does not matter when the intended injury is known to be sufficient to cause death.
- Option C: With that intention and knowledge, it is murder, not the lesser offence.
- Option D: An intended, deadly injury is certainly an offence.

Final Answer: Injury known to be sufficient to cause death ⇒ A

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q16](#)



Q17.

Solution

Principle applied: With no intention and no knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, the killing is neither culpable homicide nor murder.

Application to the facts: X fired into the air in a lonely field, believing no one was near. He had no intention to cause death. He had no knowledge that the act was likely to cause anyone's death. With neither intention nor knowledge, it is neither offence.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Merely using a gun does not make an unforeseeable death murder.
- Option B: It cannot amount to murder without intention or the required knowledge.
- Option D: Death alone is not enough; the required mental state is missing.

Final Answer: No intention and no knowledge of likely death \Rightarrow

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q17](#)

Q18.

Solution

Principle applied: Causing death by an act done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death is culpable homicide.

Application to the facts: X rolled a heavy stone down a crowded street. He knew this act was likely to cause death. A person was killed by it. Acting with knowledge that death was likely makes it culpable homicide.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Not naming a victim does not excuse an act done with knowledge of likely death.
- Option B: It was no accident; he acted with the required knowledge.
- Option C: Not touching the victim is irrelevant when his act caused the death with knowledge of the risk.

Final Answer: Knowledge that the act was likely to cause death \Rightarrow

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q18](#)



Q19.

Solution

Principle applied: A classification is valid if it rests on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the law's object.

Application to the facts: The law separates the poor from the rich, a real and understandable difference (income), which is an intelligible differentia. Its object is to help those who cannot afford medical care. Giving free care to the poor is rationally connected to that object. So the classification is valid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Equality does not require treating the rich and the poor exactly alike.
- Option C: Leaving out the rich is the very point of a valid classification here.
- Option D: The classification is valid on the two tests, not because the State may “do anything”.

Final Answer: Intelligible differentia with rational nexus ⇒ B

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q19](#)

Q20.

Solution

Principle applied: A classification that is arbitrary and rests on no intelligible differentia is invalid.

Application to the facts: The law taxes one named trader heavily while identical traders go untaxed. There is no real difference marking him off from the others. Singling him out for no policy reason is arbitrary and rests on no intelligible differentia. So it is invalid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The State cannot pick one person arbitrarily to bear a tax.
- Option B: The trader's wealth does not, by itself, justify singling only him out.
- Option D: Taxes are not “always unfair”; the flaw is the arbitrary singling out.

Final Answer: Arbitrary, no intelligible differentia ⇒ C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q20](#)



Q21.

Solution

Principle applied: A classification is valid if the difference is real and rationally connected to the law's object.

Application to the facts: Trained doctors differ in a real, understandable way from untrained persons. The law's object is patient safety in surgery. Allowing only the trained to operate is rationally connected to that object. So the classification is valid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Equality does not require letting the untrained operate.
- Option B: The rule does not unfairly "favour" doctors; it protects patients.
- Option C: It is valid on the two tests, not because the State may act "as it pleases".

Final Answer: Real difference, rational nexus to safety ⇒ D

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q21](#)

Q22.

Solution

Principle applied: A classification with an intelligible differentia and a rational nexus to the object is valid.

Application to the facts: Factory size (number of workers) is a real, understandable difference. The object is to protect the workers. Applying stricter rules to larger factories, where more workers are at risk, is rationally connected to that object. So the classification is valid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Equality does not demand identical rules for factories of very different sizes.
- Option C: Larger factories are grouped on a real difference, not singled out arbitrarily.
- Option D: The validity rests on the two tests, not on owners "having no rights".

Final Answer: Size differentia, rational nexus to worker safety ⇒ A

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q22](#)



Q23.

Solution

Principle applied: A classification with no rational connection to the law's object is invalid.

Application to the facts: The benefit is given only to those born in March. The month of birth has nothing to do with the purpose of the benefit. With no rational nexus between the differentia and the object, the second test fails. So the classification is invalid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: "A line somewhere" does not save a line with no rational connection to the object.
- Option B: A month being a clear division does not give it any nexus to the benefit's purpose.
- Option C: Benefits are not "bound to be unequal"; the flaw is the missing nexus.

Final Answer: No rational nexus to the object \Rightarrow

[Go Back to Q23](#)

Q24.

Solution

Principle applied: A classification with a real difference and a rational nexus to the object is valid.

Application to the facts: Patients with a highly infectious disease differ in a real, relevant way from other patients. The object is to stop the infection spreading. Placing them in separate wards is rationally connected to that object. So the classification is valid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Equality does not require infectious and non-infectious patients to share a ward.
- Option C: Reasonable separation on a real, relevant difference is not forbidden discrimination.
- Option D: The rule is valid on the two tests, not because hospitals may "ignore equality".

Final Answer: Infection differentia, rational nexus to prevention \Rightarrow



Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q24](#)

Q25.

Solution

Principle applied: Strict liability attaches to a non-natural use whose dangerous thing escapes and causes harm, even without negligence.

Application to the facts: A brought and kept a huge mass of water in a reservoir, a special use bringing increased danger, so a non-natural use. The water escaped when the reservoir burst. It flooded B's mine, causing harm. Under strict liability A is liable even though he was not negligent.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The absence of negligence is no defence under strict liability.
- Option C: A large stored mass of water is a non-natural use, whatever water's nature.
- Option D: Strict liability does not require any intention to cause the flood.

Final Answer: Non-natural use, escape, harm, no negligence needed ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q25](#)

Q26.

Solution

Principle applied: Strict liability applies only to a non-natural use; an ordinary use of land is outside it.

Application to the facts: A kept only ordinary quantities of water in domestic pipes for household use. That is a natural, everyday use of land, not a special dangerous one. Since there is no non-natural use, strict liability does not apply. So A is not strictly liable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Escape causing harm is not enough without a non-natural use.
- Option B: Merely keeping water is not enough; it must be a non-natural use.
- Option D: Water can give rise to liability in a non-natural use; here the use is natural.

Final Answer: Ordinary domestic use is not non-natural ⇒ **C**



Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q26](#)

Q27.

Solution

Principle applied: There is no strict liability where the escape was caused solely by the act of a stranger over whom the defendant had no control.

Application to the facts: A kept explosives, a non-natural use. But the escape happened only because a stranger deliberately set them off. A had no control over that stranger. The stranger-act exception applies, so A is not liable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The danger of the explosives does not defeat the stranger exception.
- Option B: Keeping them on his land is not enough when a stranger caused the escape.
- Option C: Strict liability does not turn on negligence at all; the correct reason is the stranger's act.

Final Answer: Escape caused solely by a stranger \Rightarrow

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q27](#)

Q28.

Solution

Principle applied: There is no strict liability where the escape was caused solely by an act of God that no human foresight could guard against.

Application to the facts: A collected dangerous chemicals, a non-natural use. They escaped only because of an utterly extraordinary, unforeseeable natural cataclysm. No human foresight could have guarded against it. The act-of-God exception applies, so A is not liable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: The chemicals being dangerous does not defeat the act-of-God exception.
- Option C: That A kept them is not enough when an act of God caused the escape.
- Option D: Storing a large mass of dangerous chemicals is a non-natural use; the real reason A escapes is the act of God.



Final Answer: Escape caused solely by an act of God ⇒ A

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q28](#)

Q29.

Solution

Principle applied: There is no strict liability where the escape was caused by the plaintiff's own fault.

Application to the facts: A stored gas, a non-natural use. It escaped only because B himself broke open the sealed store without permission. The escape was thus caused by the plaintiff's own fault. That exception applies, so A is not liable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The bare fact of escape does not impose liability when the plaintiff caused it.
- Option C: A's keeping the gas is not enough when B's own act caused the escape.
- Option D: Storing a large volume of gas is a non-natural use; the real reason A escapes is B's own fault.

Final Answer: Escape caused by the plaintiff's own fault ⇒ B

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q29](#)

Q30.

Solution

Principle applied: Where a non-natural use escapes and causes harm and no exception applies, there is strict liability even without negligence.

Application to the facts: A kept a large tank of acid, a non-natural use. The acid escaped and burned B's crops. No exception (stranger, act of God, plaintiff's fault, consent) applies. So A is strictly liable even without negligence.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Taking care is no defence under strict liability.
- Option B: Acid is a dangerous thing; treating it "like water" is wrong, and its storage here is a non-natural use.
- Option D: Strict liability needs no intention to harm.



Final Answer: Non-natural use escapes, no exception ⇒

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q30](#)



Answer Key

Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans
1	B	2	A	3	C	4	D	5	A
6	D	7	B	8	A	9	C	10	D
11	C	12	A	13	C	14	B	15	D
16	A	17	C	18	D	19	B	20	C
21	D	22	A	23	C	24	B	25	B
26	C	27	D	28	A	29	B	30	C

