

# CLAT Legal Reasoning

## Sample Paper – 4

Duration: 30 Minutes

Maximum Marks: 30

### Instructions

- This paper contains **30** Multiple Choice Questions (Single Correct Answer), modelled on the Legal Reasoning section of **CLAT** (Common Law Admission Test).
- Each correct answer carries **+1 mark**. There is a **negative marking of 0.25 marks** for every incorrect answer; unattempted questions carry no penalty.
- The paper has **five passages**, each stating one or more **legal principles** and followed by **six** questions. Apply **only** the principle(s) given in the passage to the facts; do not rely on any outside knowledge of the law.
- CLAT is an offline pen-and-paper (OMR) test with no sectional time limit; attempt this practice paper in one timed sitting of about **30 minutes**.
- Use of mobile phones, calculators, dictionaries, or electronic gadgets is strictly prohibited.

### Passage I

*Directions (Q1–Q6): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.*

**Principle:** Trespass to land is the direct and unlawful interference with another person's possession of land. It is committed by entering upon land in the possession of another without lawful justification, by remaining there after permission has ended, or by placing or throwing any object upon that land.

Trespass is *actionable in itself*: the person in possession need not prove any actual damage. The interference must be *direct*. A person who enters with the consent of the possessor is not a trespasser, but if he *abuses* that permission or stays beyond it, he becomes



one. Entry made under the *authority of law*, such as a lawful search, is not trespass.

- Q1.** A walks across B's private field without B's permission and without any lawful reason, causing no damage at all. Applying the principle, is this trespass?
- (A) No, because A caused no damage to the field.
- (B) Yes, because A entered land in B's possession without lawful justification, and trespass is actionable in itself.
- (C) No, because merely walking across land is harmless.
- (D) Yes, but only if A damaged the crops on the field.
- Q2.** C is invited into D's house as a guest. After the party ends and D asks everyone to leave, C refuses to go and stays on for hours. Applying the principle, is this trespass?
- (A) No, because C was invited in the first place.
- (B) No, because a guest can never become a trespasser.
- (C) Yes, because C remained on the land after his permission to be there had ended.
- (D) Yes, but only if C broke something in the house.
- Q3.** E, standing outside F's land, throws stones over the boundary so that they land on F's field. Applying the principle, is this trespass to land?
- (A) Yes, because E directly placed objects, the stones, upon F's land.
- (B) No, because E never set foot on the land himself.
- (C) No, because throwing something is not the same as entering.
- (D) Yes, but only if the stones hurt someone on the land.
- Q4.** G, a police officer, enters H's house to carry out a lawful search under a valid warrant. H claims trespass. Applying the principle, is H correct?
- (A) Yes, because G came onto H's land.



- (B) Yes, because H did not personally invite G in.
- (C) No, because a police officer may do absolutely anything he likes.
- (D) No, because G entered under the authority of law, and a lawful entry is not trespass.

**Q5.** I is allowed by J to enter J's farm only to collect firewood. Instead, I uses the entry to hold a noisy picnic and pitch a tent on the farm. Applying the principle, is this trespass?

- (A) Yes, because I abused the limited permission given and used the land for a purpose outside it.
- (B) No, because I had permission to enter the farm.
- (C) No, because collecting firewood had been allowed.
- (D) Yes, but only if J's crops were damaged by the picnic.

**Q6.** K deliberately drives his car onto L's private lawn without permission, leaving tyre marks but no real damage. Applying the principle, is this trespass?

- (A) No, because there was no real damage to the lawn.
- (B) No, because a car is not a person entering the land.
- (C) Yes, but only if L saw the car come onto the lawn.
- (D) Yes, because K directly and without permission entered L's land, and trespass is actionable in itself.

### Passage II

*Directions (Q7–Q12): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.*

**Principle:** Coercion is the committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by law, or the unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property, with the intention of causing a person to enter into an agreement.

When consent to an agreement is obtained by coercion, the agreement is a contract *voidable at the option* of the party whose consent was so obtained; that party may either



affirm the contract or set it aside. A threat to do what one has a *lawful right* to do, such as to file a genuine lawsuit, is not coercion. Coercion may be directed against the person or against *another*, and it need not come only from the other party to the agreement.

- Q7.** A points a knife at B and threatens to stab him unless B signs a sale deed. B signs out of fear. Applying the principle, what is the status of the contract?
- (A) The consent is free and the contract is fully binding on B.
  - (B) The contract is voidable at B's option, because his consent was obtained by coercion.
  - (C) The contract is perfectly valid because B did in fact sign it.
  - (D) The contract is void, and B may himself be punished for signing.
- Q8.** C threatens to file a genuine, honest lawsuit against D to recover a real debt unless D agrees to a repayment plan. D agrees. Applying the principle, is this coercion?
- (A) Yes, because D felt pressured into agreeing.
  - (B) Yes, because the prospect of a lawsuit is frightening.
  - (C) No, because threatening to do what one has a lawful right to do, such as filing a genuine suit, is not coercion.
  - (D) No, because a debt need never be repaid.
- Q9.** E unlawfully detains F's goods and refuses to return them unless F signs an agreement. F signs to get the goods back. Applying the principle, is this coercion?
- (A) Yes, because E unlawfully detained F's property in order to make F enter the agreement, which is coercion.
  - (B) No, because E did not threaten F's body.
  - (C) No, because goods are property and not a person.
  - (D) Yes, but only if the goods were valuable ones.



- Q10.** G threatens to harm H's young child unless H signs a contract, and H signs. Since the threat was against the child and not H himself, applying the principle, is it coercion?
- (A) No, because the threat was not against H's own body.
  - (B) No, because only a threat to the person signing can count.
  - (C) Yes, but only if the child is actually harmed.
  - (D) Yes, because coercion may be directed against another person, such as H's child, and it caused H to sign.
- Q11.** I obtains J's consent to a contract by coercion. Later, of his own free will and fully aware, J decides he is happy with the contract and wishes to keep it. Applying the principle, can J affirm it?
- (A) No, because a coerced contract is always void and dead.
  - (B) Yes, because a contract made by coercion is voidable at J's option, and he may choose to affirm it.
  - (C) No, because only a court can revive such a contract.
  - (D) Yes, but only if I gives his consent once again.
- Q12.** K, a stranger with no connection to the contract between L and M, threatens L with an unlawful act to make L sign M's contract, and L signs. Applying the principle, can L avoid it, even though the coercion came from K and not M?
- (A) No, because M himself did not threaten L.
  - (B) No, because coercion must come from the other party to the contract only.
  - (C) Yes, because coercion need not come from the other party, and L's consent was obtained by it, so the contract is voidable at L's option.
  - (D) Yes, but only if K is first punished for his threat.

Passage III



*Directions (Q13–Q18): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.*

**Principle:** A harm suffered by a person who has *freely and knowingly consented* to the risk of that harm is generally not actionable, on the principle that to one who consents, no wrong is done. The consent must be free, given by a person competent to consent, and must extend to the very harm or risk suffered.

However, consent is *no defence* where the act consented to is itself *unlawful* (for example, a fight intended to cause serious hurt), or where consent was obtained by *fraud* or given under a mistake as to the nature of the act, or where it was given by a person *not competent* to consent, such as a young child or a person of unsound mind.

- Q13.** A, an adult, freely agrees to play a lawful game of contact football, and in a fair tackle within the rules he is bruised. He sues the other player. Applying the principle, is the defence of consent available?
- (A) Actionable, because A was in fact hurt.
- (B) Not actionable, because A freely consented to the ordinary risks of a lawful game and was hurt within the rules.
- (C) Actionable, because football is a dangerous game.
- (D) Not actionable, because a game can never lead to any liability.
- Q14.** B agrees to a surgery after the doctor fully explains its risks. The very risk explained then materialises despite proper care. Applying the principle, does consent bar a claim for that risk?
- (A) Yes, because B gave free and informed consent to the very risk that materialised.
- (B) No, because B was harmed by the surgery.
- (C) No, because surgery is always a risky thing.
- (D) Yes, but only if B signed as many as ten consent forms.
- Q15.** C tricks D into an act by lying about its true nature, and D “consents” only because of that lie. Applying the principle, is D’s consent a good defence?



- (A) Yes, because D did say yes to the act.
- (B) Yes, because C gave D some explanation.
- (C) No, because D's consent was obtained by fraud as to the nature of the act, so it is no defence.
- (D) No, because any act becomes lawful once a person says yes.

**Q16.** E persuades a very young child, too young to understand, to “agree” to a harmful act. Applying the principle, is the child's consent a defence?

- (A) Yes, because the child nodded in agreement.
- (B) No, because a young child is not competent to consent, so the consent is no defence.
- (C) Yes, because any agreement, from anyone, counts.
- (D) No, because children must always obey adults.

**Q17.** F and G agree to a street brawl, each intending to cause the other serious hurt. G is seriously injured and sues F. Applying the principle, is consent a defence?

- (A) Not actionable, because G agreed to fight.
- (B) Not actionable, because both of them wanted the fight.
- (C) Actionable, because fighting is unhealthy.
- (D) Actionable, because consent is no defence where the act consented to is itself unlawful, such as a fight intended to cause serious hurt.

**Q18.** H, an adult of sound mind, freely allows a friend to pierce his ear, a lawful act, and it hurts as expected. He then sues the friend. Applying the principle, is there a defence?

- (A) Not actionable, because H, competent and free, consented to the very lawful act and its ordinary consequence.
- (B) Actionable, because the piercing hurt him.
- (C) Actionable, because piercing draws blood.



(D) Not actionable, because a friend can never be liable.

### Passage IV

*Directions (Q19–Q24): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.*

**Principle:** The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds *only* of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. The State may not treat a citizen unfavourably where the *sole* ground for doing so is one of these.

Because the ban is on discrimination on these grounds *only*, a distinction based on some other permissible ground is not forbidden merely because it happens also to affect people of a particular religion or caste. The State is expressly *permitted* to make special provisions for the benefit of women and children, and for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes. This protection is available to citizens.

**Q19.** A State refuses a government job to a citizen solely because he belongs to a particular caste. Applying the principle, is this valid?

- (A) Valid, because the State may choose its own employees.
- (B) Invalid, because refusing the job solely on the ground of caste is discrimination forbidden by the principle.
- (C) Valid, because caste is a purely personal matter.
- (D) Invalid, because all government jobs ought to be abolished.

**Q20.** A State makes a special scheme providing free education and hostels specially for women and children. A man challenges it as discrimination. Applying the principle, is it valid?

- (A) Invalid, because it excludes men from the scheme.
- (B) Invalid, because everyone must be given the same scheme.
- (C) Valid, because the State is expressly permitted to make special provisions for the benefit of women and children.
- (D) Valid, because men have no need of education.

**Q21.** A State selects candidates for a music post purely on the basis of a fair



talent test, and it turns out that most of those selected belong to one community. Applying the principle, is this forbidden discrimination?

- (A) Yes, because most of those selected are from one community.
- (B) Yes, because communities must always be balanced exactly.
- (C) Yes, because a music post should be shared out evenly.
- (D) No, because the selection was made on the permissible ground of talent, not on religion or caste only, even though it happened to affect one community.

**Q22.** A State denies a citizen entry to a public park solely because of the citizen's religion. Applying the principle, is this valid?

- (A) Invalid, because denying access to a public park solely on the ground of religion is forbidden discrimination.
- (B) Valid, because a public park is State property.
- (C) Valid, because a person's religion is a private matter.
- (D) Invalid, because public parks must be closed to everybody.

**Q23.** A State reserves some college seats for the advancement of a socially and educationally backward class. A general-category student challenges it. Applying the principle, is it valid?

- (A) Invalid, because seats must be open to all equally.
- (B) Invalid, because reservations of any kind are always unfair.
- (C) Valid, because general-category students have no need of college.
- (D) Valid, because the State may make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes.

**Q24.** A State bars a citizen from a scholarship solely because he was born in a particular place, and for no other reason. Applying the principle, is this valid?

- (A) Valid, because the State funds the scholarship.



- (B) Valid, because a person's place of birth is easy to check.
- (C) Invalid, because denying the scholarship solely on the ground of place of birth is forbidden discrimination.
- (D) Invalid, because all scholarships ought to be abolished.

### Passage V

*Directions (Q25–Q30): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.*

**Principle:** False imprisonment is the *total restraint* of a person's liberty, without lawful justification, for however short a time. The restraint must be complete: the person must be confined within limits fixed by another, with *no reasonable means of escape* known to him.

If there is a reasonable way out that the person knows of, there is no total restraint and so no false imprisonment. The restraint may be brought about by physical barriers or by a *show of authority* to which the person submits. There is no false imprisonment where the person *consented* to the confinement, or where the detention is under *lawful authority*, such as a lawful arrest. A mere partial obstruction, blocking one way while another is open, is not false imprisonment.

- Q25.** A locks B alone in a room with no other exit for an hour, without any lawful reason. Applying the principle, is this false imprisonment?
- (A) No, because it was only for one hour.
  - (B) Yes, because B was completely confined without lawful justification and with no means of escape.
  - (C) No, because B was not physically hurt.
  - (D) Yes, but only if B shouted for help.
- Q26.** C blocks one footpath in front of D, but another equally convenient path, which D knows of, is fully open. Applying the principle, is this false imprisonment?
- (A) Yes, because C blocked D's way forward.
  - (B) Yes, because D was annoyed by the obstruction.



- (C) No, because a reasonable way out was open and known to D, so there was no total restraint.
- (D) No, because footpaths are in any case public property.

**Q27.** A police officer lawfully arrests E under a valid warrant and holds him in custody. E claims false imprisonment. Applying the principle, is he correct?

- (A) Yes, because E was held against his will.
- (B) Yes, because E was not free to leave.
- (C) No, because the police may hold anyone for as long as they wish.
- (D) No, because a detention under lawful authority, such as a valid arrest, is not false imprisonment.

**Q28.** Security guards, by a show of authority, order F to stay in a room, and F, submitting to their apparent authority, remains, although they had no lawful right to detain him. Applying the principle, is this false imprisonment?

- (A) Yes, because F was totally restrained by a show of authority he submitted to, with no lawful justification.
- (B) No, because none of the guards actually touched F.
- (C) No, because F could have fought his way out.
- (D) Yes, but only if the guards were armed.

**Q29.** G willingly agrees to be locked inside a friend's escape-room game for fun, knowing that he has agreed to be confined. He later sues for false imprisonment. Applying the principle, is he correct?

- (A) Yes, because G was locked in.
- (B) No, because G consented to the confinement, so there is no false imprisonment.
- (C) Yes, because being locked in is always wrong.
- (D) No, because such games are never legal.



- Q30.** H is completely shut inside a store room by I, with the only door locked and no other way out, for ten minutes and with no lawful reason. Applying the principle, is this false imprisonment despite the short time?
- (A) No, because ten minutes is far too short a time to matter.
  - (B) No, because H was given air to breathe.
  - (C) Yes, but only if H was actually injured.
  - (D) Yes, because false imprisonment is a total restraint of liberty for however short a time, and H was completely confined without justification.



**Detailed Solutions**

Q1.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Entering another's land without lawful justification is trespass, which is actionable in itself.

**Application to the facts:** A walked across B's private field. He had no permission and no lawful reason to do so. That is a direct, unlawful entry onto land in B's possession. Since trespass is actionable in itself, the absence of damage does not matter.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: No damage is needed, as trespass is actionable per se.
- Option C: Walking is still an entry, and an unlawful one here.
- Option D: Trespass does not depend on damage to the crops.

**Final Answer:** Unlawful entry, actionable in itself ⇒ **B**

**Answer: (B)** [Go Back to Q1](#)

Q2.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A person who remains on land after his permission has ended becomes a trespasser.

**Application to the facts:** C was first invited as a guest, so his entry was lawful. Once D asked everyone to leave, C's permission ended. By staying on for hours after that, C remained without permission. So he became a trespasser.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: The original invitation does not cover staying after it is withdrawn.
- Option B: A guest *can* become a trespasser by overstaying.
- Option D: Trespass by overstaying does not require breaking anything.

**Final Answer:** Remained after permission ended ⇒ **C**

**Answer: (C)** [Go Back to Q2](#)



Q3.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Placing or throwing an object onto another's land is trespass.

**Application to the facts:** E threw stones over the boundary. The stones landed directly on F's field. Placing objects onto another's land is expressly a form of trespass. So E is a trespasser even though he did not enter himself.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option B: Trespass can be committed by throwing objects onto land without setting foot on it.
- Option C: The principle treats throwing objects onto land as trespass, alongside entering.
- Option D: No injury to a person is required.

**Final Answer:** Directly placing objects on the land  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer: (A)** [Go Back to Q3](#)

Q4.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Entry made under the authority of law, such as a lawful search, is not trespass.

**Application to the facts:** G entered H's house to carry out a search. He did so under a valid warrant, that is, under the authority of law. A lawful entry is expressly not trespass. So H is not correct.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Coming onto the land under lawful authority is not trespass.
- Option B: A personal invitation is not needed when entry is under authority of law.
- Option C: The reason is the lawful authority, not any claim that police may do "anything".

**Final Answer:** Entry under authority of law is not trespass  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer: (D)** [Go Back to Q4](#)



Q5.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A person who abuses a limited permission, using the land for a purpose outside it, becomes a trespasser.

**Application to the facts:** J allowed I onto the farm only to collect firewood. I instead held a picnic and pitched a tent. That use is outside the limited permission given. By abusing the permission, I became a trespasser.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option B: Permission to enter for one purpose does not cover an entirely different use.
- Option C: Firewood being allowed does not authorise a picnic and a tent.
- Option D: Trespass by abuse of permission does not depend on crop damage.

**Final Answer:** Abuse of a limited permission  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer: (A)** [Go Back to Q5](#)

Q6.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A direct, unauthorised entry onto land is trespass, actionable in itself.

**Application to the facts:** K drove his car onto L's private lawn. He had no permission to do so. Driving a car onto the lawn is a direct entry onto L's land. Trespass being actionable per se, the lack of real damage does not matter.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Damage is not required for trespass.
- Option B: Driving the car onto the land is K's own direct entry onto it.
- Option C: Trespass does not depend on the possessor having seen it.

**Final Answer:** Direct unauthorised entry, actionable per se  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer: (D)** [Go Back to Q6](#)



Q7.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Consent obtained by coercion makes the contract voidable at the option of the coerced party.

**Application to the facts:** A threatened to stab B, an act forbidden by law, to make him sign. B signed only out of that fear. His consent was thus obtained by coercion. So the contract is voidable at B's option.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Consent under a threat of stabbing is not free.
- Option C: Signing under coercion does not make the contract binding.
- Option D: The contract is voidable, not void, and the coerced party is not the wrongdoer to be punished.

**Final Answer:** Consent by coercion, voidable at B's option ⇒

**Answer: (B)** [Go Back to Q7](#)

Q8.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A threat to do what one has a lawful right to do, such as filing a genuine lawsuit, is not coercion.

**Application to the facts:** C threatened only to file a genuine, honest suit to recover a real debt. Filing such a suit is something C has a lawful right to do. A threat to exercise a lawful right is not coercion. So D's agreement was not obtained by coercion.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Feeling pressured by a lawful threat does not make it coercion.
- Option B: That a lawsuit is frightening does not turn a lawful threat into coercion.
- Option D: The debt being repayable is beside the point; the key is that the threat was lawful.

**Final Answer:** Threat to exercise a lawful right is not coercion ⇒

**Answer: (C)** [Go Back to Q8](#)



Q9.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Unlawfully detaining property to make a person enter an agreement is coercion.

**Application to the facts:** E unlawfully detained F's goods. He refused to return them unless F signed. This was done to make F enter the agreement. Unlawful detention of property for that purpose is coercion.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option B: Coercion is not limited to threats to the body; it includes unlawful detention of property.
- Option C: The principle expressly covers unlawfully detaining property.
- Option D: The value of the goods does not decide whether it is coercion.

**Final Answer:** Unlawful detention of property to force agreement ⇒

**Answer: (A)** [Go Back to Q9](#)

Q10.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Coercion may be directed against another person, not only against the party who signs.

**Application to the facts:** G threatened to harm H's child. That threat, though aimed at the child, was used to make H sign. Coercion may be directed against another. So H's consent was obtained by coercion.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: The threat need not be against H's own body.
- Option B: A threat to another person can amount to coercion.
- Option C: It is coercion whether or not the child is actually harmed.

**Final Answer:** Coercion may be aimed at another person ⇒

**Answer: (D)** [Go Back to Q10](#)



Q11.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A contract made by coercion is voidable at the option of the coerced party, who may affirm or avoid it.

**Application to the facts:** J's consent was obtained by coercion, so the contract is voidable at his option. Being voidable, it is not automatically dead; the choice is J's. J, freely and fully aware, chooses to keep it. So J may affirm the contract.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: A coerced contract is voidable, not automatically void.
- Option C: J can affirm it himself; no court is needed to “revive” it.
- Option D: Affirmation is J's own choice and does not need I's fresh consent.

**Final Answer:** Voidable at J's option; he may affirm ⇒

**Answer: (B)** [Go Back to Q11](#)

Q12.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Coercion need not come from the other party; if consent was obtained by it, the contract is voidable at the coerced party's option.

**Application to the facts:** K, a stranger to the contract, coerced L into signing M's contract. The principle says coercion need not come only from the other party. L's consent was in fact obtained by that coercion. So the contract is voidable at L's option.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: It does not matter that M did not threaten L.
- Option B: The principle expressly says coercion need not come from the other party.
- Option D: L's right to avoid does not depend on K first being punished.

**Final Answer:** Coercion by a stranger still makes it voidable ⇒

**Answer: (C)** [Go Back to Q12](#)



Q13.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Harm within a freely accepted risk of a lawful activity is not actionable.

**Application to the facts:** A, an adult, freely agreed to play a lawful contact game. Bruising in a fair tackle within the rules is an ordinary risk of that game. A consented to those very risks. So his injury within the rules is not actionable.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Being hurt is not enough where the risk was freely accepted.
- Option C: The general danger of football does not defeat a consent to its ordinary risks.
- Option D: Games are not blanket-immune; here it is the free consent to the risk that bars the claim.

**Final Answer:** Free consent to the ordinary risk of a lawful game ⇒

**Answer: (B)** [Go Back to Q13](#)

Q14.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Consent that extends to the very risk suffered bars a claim for that risk.

**Application to the facts:** The doctor fully explained the risks and B agreed. The very risk explained then materialised, despite proper care. B's free and informed consent extended to that exact risk. So consent bars the claim.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option B: Mere harm does not defeat consent that covered the risk.
- Option C: The general riskiness of surgery is not the point; B consented to this risk.
- Option D: The number of forms signed is irrelevant to valid informed consent.

**Final Answer:** Informed consent to the very risk ⇒

**Answer: (A)** [Go Back to Q14](#)



Q15.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Consent obtained by fraud as to the nature of the act is no defence.

**Application to the facts:** C lied to D about the true nature of the act. D “agreed” only because of that lie. Consent obtained by fraud as to the nature of the act is no consent in law. So D’s consent is no defence.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: A “yes” procured by fraud is not valid consent.
- Option B: Giving some explanation, when it is a lie about the act’s nature, does not save the consent.
- Option D: An act is not made lawful by a consent obtained through fraud.

**Final Answer:** Consent by fraud as to the act is no defence ⇒  C

**Answer: (C)** [Go Back to Q15](#)

Q16.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Consent given by a person not competent to consent, such as a young child, is no defence.

**Application to the facts:** E obtained the “agreement” of a very young child. The child was too young to understand. A young child is not competent to consent. So the child’s consent is no defence.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: A nod from an incompetent child is not valid consent.
- Option C: Not “any agreement, from anyone” counts; the giver must be competent.
- Option D: A duty to obey adults does not create valid consent to a harmful act.

**Final Answer:** A young child cannot give valid consent ⇒  B

**Answer: (B)** [Go Back to Q16](#)



Q17.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Consent is no defence where the act consented to is itself unlawful, such as a fight intended to cause serious hurt.

**Application to the facts:** F and G agreed to a street brawl. Each intended to cause the other serious hurt, which is itself unlawful. Consent to such an unlawful act is no defence. So G's claim against F is actionable.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Agreeing to fight does not bar the claim, since the act consented to is unlawful.
- Option B: That both wanted it does not make consent a defence to an unlawful fight.
- Option C: The reason is the unlawfulness of the act, not that fighting is merely "unhealthy".

**Final Answer:** Consent to an unlawful fight is no defence  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer:** (D) [Go Back to Q17](#)

Q18.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** Free consent by a competent person to a lawful act, extending to its ordinary consequence, is a good defence.

**Application to the facts:** H is an adult of sound mind, competent to consent. He freely allowed a friend to pierce his ear, a lawful act. The pain was the ordinary consequence he consented to. So the defence of consent is available.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option B: The pain is the very consequence H consented to.
- Option C: That piercing draws blood is part of the act he agreed to.
- Option D: Friendship is not the reason; the free consent to a lawful act is.

**Final Answer:** Free consent by a competent person to a lawful act  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer:** (A) [Go Back to Q18](#)



Q19.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** The State may not treat a citizen unfavourably solely on the ground of caste.

**Application to the facts:** The State refused the job to the citizen. The sole ground was that he belonged to a particular caste. Discrimination on the ground of caste only is forbidden. So the refusal is invalid.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: The freedom to choose employees does not permit caste-based refusal.
- Option C: Caste being “personal” does not make caste-based refusal valid.
- Option D: The flaw is the caste ground, not any need to abolish government jobs.

**Final Answer:** Refusal solely on caste is forbidden ⇒  B

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q19](#)

Q20.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** The State is expressly permitted to make special provisions for the benefit of women and children.

**Application to the facts:** The scheme provides free education and hostels specially for women and children. The principle expressly permits such special provisions. That it excludes men does not make it forbidden discrimination. So the scheme is valid.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Excluding men is exactly what a special provision for women and children may do.
- Option B: Equality does not require an identical scheme for everyone here.
- Option D: The validity rests on the permitted special provision, not on any claim that men need no education.

**Final Answer:** Special provision for women and children is permitted ⇒  C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q20](#)



Q21.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A distinction on a permissible ground is not forbidden merely because it also happens to affect one community.

**Application to the facts:** Selection was made purely on a fair talent test, a permissible ground. It was not made on religion or caste only. That most selected happen to belong to one community is only an incidental effect. So it is not forbidden discrimination.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: An incidental community imbalance from a talent test is not discrimination on caste or religion only.
- Option B: The principle does not require exact balancing of communities.
- Option C: Sharing out a post evenly is not required when selection is on a permissible ground.

**Final Answer:** Selection on talent, not on religion or caste only ⇒

**Answer: (D)** [Go Back to Q21](#)

Q22.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** The State may not treat a citizen unfavourably solely on the ground of religion.

**Application to the facts:** The State denied the citizen entry to a public park. The sole ground was the citizen's religion. Discrimination on the ground of religion only is forbidden. So the denial is invalid.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option B: A public park being State property does not permit religion-based exclusion.
- Option C: Religion being "private" does not validate a religion-based denial.
- Option D: The flaw is the religion ground, not any need to close parks to all.

**Final Answer:** Denial solely on religion is forbidden ⇒

**Answer: (A)** [Go Back to Q22](#)



Q23.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** The State may make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes.

**Application to the facts:** The State reserved seats for a socially and educationally backward class. The principle expressly permits such a special provision. A general-category student's objection does not defeat a permitted provision. So the reservation is valid.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Seats need not be open to all equally where a permitted special provision applies.
- Option B: Reservations are not "always unfair"; this one is expressly permitted.
- Option C: The validity rests on the permitted provision, not on any claim that general students need no college.

**Final Answer:** Special provision for backward classes is permitted  $\Rightarrow$   D

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q23](#)

Q24.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** The State may not treat a citizen unfavourably solely on the ground of place of birth.

**Application to the facts:** The State barred the citizen from the scholarship. The sole ground was his place of birth. Discrimination on the ground of place of birth only is forbidden. So the bar is invalid.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Funding the scholarship does not permit a place-of-birth bar.
- Option B: Place of birth being easy to check does not make it a lawful ground.
- Option D: The flaw is the place-of-birth ground, not any need to abolish scholarships.

**Final Answer:** Bar solely on place of birth is forbidden  $\Rightarrow$   C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q24](#)



Q25.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A total restraint of liberty without lawful justification is false imprisonment, however short.

**Application to the facts:** A locked B alone in a room with no other exit. B was completely confined, with no means of escape. There was no lawful reason for it. So it is false imprisonment.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Even a short confinement can be false imprisonment.
- Option C: Physical hurt is not required.
- Option D: The wrong does not depend on B calling for help.

**Final Answer:** Total restraint without justification  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer: (B)** [Go Back to Q25](#)

Q26.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** If a reasonable means of escape is open and known, there is no total restraint and no false imprisonment.

**Application to the facts:** C blocked only one footpath. Another equally convenient path was fully open. D knew of that open way. Since a reasonable way out was known to D, there was no total restraint.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Blocking one way while another is open is only a partial obstruction.
- Option B: Annoyance is not the same as total restraint.
- Option D: The reason is the open, known escape route, not that footpaths are public.

**Final Answer:** A reasonable known escape existed  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer: (C)** [Go Back to Q26](#)



Q27.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A detention under lawful authority, such as a valid arrest, is not false imprisonment.

**Application to the facts:** E was arrested by a police officer. The arrest was under a valid warrant, that is, under lawful authority. A detention under lawful authority is expressly not false imprisonment. So E is not correct.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Being held against one's will is lawful when done under a valid arrest.
- Option B: Not being free to leave is expected in a lawful arrest.
- Option C: The correct reason is the lawful authority, not any claim that police may hold anyone forever.

**Final Answer:** Detention under lawful authority  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer: (D)** [Go Back to Q27](#)

Q28.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** A restraint by a show of authority to which the person submits, without lawful justification, is false imprisonment.

**Application to the facts:** The guards ordered F to stay, using a show of authority. F submitted to that apparent authority and remained. The guards had no lawful right to detain him. A total restraint by a show of authority, without justification, is false imprisonment.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option B: Physical touching is not required; submission to a show of authority is enough.
- Option C: Once F submits to the apparent authority, he is restrained; he need not fight his way out.
- Option D: It does not depend on the guards being armed.

**Final Answer:** Restraint by a show of authority submitted to  $\Rightarrow$

**Answer: (A)** [Go Back to Q28](#)



Q29.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** There is no false imprisonment where the person consented to the confinement.

**Application to the facts:** G willingly agreed to be locked in the escape-room game. He knew he was agreeing to be confined for fun. Consent to the confinement removes the wrong. So there is no false imprisonment.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: Being locked in is not actionable where it was consented to.
- Option C: Confinement is not “always wrong”; consent makes it lawful here.
- Option D: The reason is G’s consent, not any claim that such games are illegal.

**Final Answer:** Consent to the confinement ⇒

**Answer: (B)** [Go Back to Q29](#)

Q30.

**Solution**

**Principle applied:** False imprisonment is a total restraint of liberty for however short a time.

**Application to the facts:** H was completely shut in a store room. The only door was locked and there was no other way out. There was no lawful reason for it. A total restraint, even for only ten minutes, is false imprisonment.

**Why the other options are wrong:**

- Option A: A short time does not prevent false imprisonment.
- Option B: Being given air does not cure the total restraint.
- Option C: No injury is required for false imprisonment.

**Final Answer:** Total restraint, however short ⇒

**Answer: (D)** [Go Back to Q30](#)



## Answer Key

Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans
1	B	2	C	3	A	4	D	5	A
6	D	7	B	8	C	9	A	10	D
11	B	12	C	13	B	14	A	15	C
16	B	17	D	18	A	19	B	20	C
21	D	22	A	23	D	24	C	25	B
26	C	27	D	28	A	29	B	30	D

