

CLAT Legal Reasoning

Sample Paper – 5

Duration: 30 Minutes

Maximum Marks: 30

Instructions

- This paper contains **30** Multiple Choice Questions (Single Correct Answer), modelled on the Legal Reasoning section of **CLAT** (Common Law Admission Test).
- Each correct answer carries **+1 mark**. There is a **negative marking of 0.25 marks** for every incorrect answer; unattempted questions carry no penalty.
- The paper has **five passages**, each stating one or more **legal principles** and followed by **six** questions. Apply **only** the principle(s) given in the passage to the facts; do not rely on any outside knowledge of the law.
- CLAT is an offline pen-and-paper (OMR) test with no sectional time limit; attempt this practice paper in one timed sitting of about **30 minutes**.
- Use of mobile phones, calculators, dictionaries, or electronic gadgets is strictly prohibited.

Passage I

Directions (Q1–Q6): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: Where a person suffers harm partly because of another's negligence and partly because of his own failure to take reasonable care for his own safety, this is *contributory negligence*. In such a case the damages he can recover are *reduced in proportion* to his own share of the fault; he is not wholly barred, but he recovers less.

To amount to contributory negligence, the claimant's own carelessness must have contributed to the harm he suffered. If the claimant took all reasonable care for his own safety, there is no contributory negligence and his damages are not reduced. A person is



not guilty of contributory negligence merely because, faced with a sudden danger created by another, he makes a reasonable but imperfect choice in the *agony of the moment*.

- Q1.** A drives negligently and hits B, who was crossing the road carelessly without looking and so was himself partly at fault. Applying the principle, what is the effect on B's damages?
- (A) B recovers nothing at all.
 - (B) B's damages are reduced in proportion to his own share of the fault, but he is not wholly barred.
 - (C) B recovers full damages regardless of his own carelessness.
 - (D) A pays nothing, because B was careless.
- Q2.** C carefully crosses at a signal with the walk sign on, taking all reasonable care, and D, driving negligently, still hits him. Applying the principle, is there contributory negligence reducing C's damages?
- (A) Yes, because C was on the road at all.
 - (B) Yes, because pedestrians are always partly at fault.
 - (C) No, because C took all reasonable care for his own safety, so there is no contributory negligence.
 - (D) No, because drivers are never at fault.
- Q3.** E, faced with a car suddenly hurtling at him because of F's negligence, jumps the wrong way in the agony of the moment and is hurt, though a calmer choice might have saved him. Applying the principle, is this contributory negligence?
- (A) Yes, because E made the wrong choice.
 - (B) Yes, because E should have jumped the other way.
 - (C) No, because E can never be held responsible.
 - (D) No, because, faced with a sudden danger created by F, E made a reasonable but imperfect choice in the agony of the moment.



- Q4.** G rides a motorcycle without a helmet, which is his own carelessness, and when H negligently hits him he suffers a head injury that a helmet would have reduced. Applying the principle, what is the effect?
- (A) G's damages are reduced to the extent that his own failure to wear a helmet contributed to his head injury.
 - (B) G recovers nothing at all.
 - (C) G recovers in full, since H was the one who hit him.
 - (D) H pays nothing at all.
- Q5.** I, a pedestrian, takes every reasonable precaution but is hurt purely by J's negligence, with no carelessness on I's part at all. Applying the principle, are I's damages reduced?
- (A) Yes, reduced by half automatically.
 - (B) No, because I took all reasonable care, so there is no contributory negligence and his damages are not reduced.
 - (C) Yes, because everyone always shares some fault.
 - (D) No, because pedestrians cannot claim at all.
- Q6.** K carelessly steps onto a live worksite, ignoring clear barriers and warnings, and is also hurt partly by L's negligence there. Applying the principle, what is the effect on K's claim?
- (A) K recovers full damages.
 - (B) K recovers nothing, because he ignored the barriers.
 - (C) K's damages are reduced in proportion to his own share of the fault, since his carelessness also contributed to the harm.
 - (D) L is completely free of any liability.

Passage II

Directions (Q7–Q12): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.



Principle: A contract is induced by *undue influence* where one party is in a position to *dominate the will* of the other and uses that position to obtain an *unfair advantage*. A person is in such a position where he holds real or apparent authority over the other, or stands in a relation of trust to him, or contracts with a person whose mental capacity is affected by age, illness or distress.

Where such domination and an unfair transaction are shown, the burden lies on the *dominant party* to prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence. A contract obtained by undue influence is *voidable* at the option of the party whose will was dominated. A transaction is not set aside merely because it is a hard bargain, if there was no domination of the will.

- Q7.** A spiritual guru, completely trusted by his elderly devotee D, persuades D to gift him most of D's property on unfair terms. Applying the principle, is this undue influence?
- (A) Yes, because the guru stood in a relation of trust to D and used it to gain an unfair advantage, which is undue influence.
 - (B) No, because D signed the gift willingly.
 - (C) No, because a gift is always valid once made.
 - (D) Yes, but only if D was forced at knifepoint.
- Q8.** A doctor treating a seriously ill and distressed patient P gets P, while gravely weak, to sign over valuable assets far below their worth. Applying the principle, is this undue influence?
- (A) Yes, because the doctor was in a position to dominate the will of a patient weakened by illness and distress, and gained an unfair advantage.
 - (B) No, because the patient could still think for himself.
 - (C) No, because doctors are honest people.
 - (D) Yes, but only if the doctor threatened P.
- Q9.** Two experienced businessmen of equal standing strike a hard bargain, and one later regrets the poor deal, though there was no domination of his will. Applying the principle, is this undue influence?



- (A) Yes, because the deal was a poor one for him.
- (B) Yes, because he now regrets it.
- (C) No, because a mere hard bargain, with no domination of the will, is not undue influence.
- (D) No, because a businessman can never complain about a deal.

Q10. Where domination and an unfair transaction have been shown, applying the principle, who must prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence?

- (A) The dominated party must fully prove the undue influence.
- (B) No one needs to prove anything at all.
- (C) The court must prove it on its own.
- (D) The dominant party must prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence.

Q11. An employer with real authority over a junior, dependent employee uses that authority to pressure him into an unfair personal loan on harsh terms. Applying the principle, is this undue influence?

- (A) No, because the employee agreed to the loan.
- (B) Yes, because the employer held real authority over the employee and used it to gain an unfair advantage, so the contract is voidable at the employee's option.
- (C) No, because employees must obey their employers.
- (D) Yes, but only if the employee was later dismissed.

Q12. A son of full capacity and free mind, under no domination, sells his own land to his father at a fair price, and later simply changes his mind. Applying the principle, is this undue influence?

- (A) Yes, because they are father and son.
- (B) Yes, because he has changed his mind.
- (C) No, because the price agreed was a fair one.



- (D) No, because there was no domination of the son's will, so there is no undue influence.

Passage III

Directions (Q13–Q18): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the *common intention* of all, each of those persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. The essence of this liability is a prior meeting of minds, a shared plan or common intention, formed before or at the time of the act.

It is not necessary that each participant personally do the same act; it is enough that each shares the common intention and *participates in some way* in furtherance of it. Mere presence at the scene, without any sharing of the common intention, does not make a person liable. A common intention may develop even on the spot, but there must be a *shared* intention, not merely a similar or parallel intention held independently by each.

- Q13.** A, B and C plan together to rob a house, and during the robbery, as planned, B alone strikes the guard dead while A and C hold the guard down. Applying the principle, what is the liability of A and C for the killing?
- (A) A and C are liable for the killing in the same manner as B, because it was done in furtherance of their common intention.
- (B) Only B is liable, since A and C did not strike the blow.
- (C) No one is liable for the killing.
- (D) A and C are liable only for the robbery, never for the killing.
- Q14.** D happens to be standing in the street when a fight breaks out and a man is killed. D shares no plan and takes no part in it. Applying the principle, is D liable under common intention?
- (A) Yes, because D was present at the scene.
- (B) Yes, because he did not try to stop it.
- (C) No, because mere presence at the scene, without sharing the common intention, does not make D liable.



(D) Yes, because bystanders are responsible for what they see.

Q15. E and F, on the spot and without any prior planning, suddenly form a shared intention to beat G, and together do so, and G dies. Applying the principle, can there be common intention though it was formed on the spot?

(A) No, because there was no prior plan made in advance.

(B) No, because a common intention must always be formed days earlier.

(C) Yes, but only if E and F had signed a written agreement.

(D) Yes, because a common intention may develop even on the spot, and here E and F shared it and acted together.

Q16. Two pickpockets, H and I, unknown to each other, happen to pick the same victim's pockets at the same moment, each acting entirely on his own. Applying the principle, is there common intention?

(A) No, because their intentions were merely similar and parallel, held independently, not a shared common intention.

(B) Yes, because they robbed the same person.

(C) Yes, because they acted at the same moment.

(D) No, because pickpocketing is only a minor offence.

Q17. J and K share a plan to assault L. K holds L down while J beats him, K himself never striking a blow. Applying the principle, is K liable for the beating?

(A) No, because K never actually struck L.

(B) No, because only the one who beats the victim is liable.

(C) Yes, because K shared the common intention and participated by holding L down in furtherance of it, so he is liable as if he beat L.

(D) Yes, but only if K also struck at least one blow.

Q18. M and N form a common intention only to frighten O with sticks. With no plan to kill, N unexpectedly pulls out a hidden gun of his own and



shoots O dead, a wholly different act outside the shared plan. Applying the principle, is M liable for the shooting under their common intention?

- (A) Yes, because M was there together with N.
- (B) No, because the shooting was a wholly different act outside the shared common intention, done by N on his own.
- (C) Yes, because they both carried some kind of weapon.
- (D) Yes, because M did intend to frighten O.

Passage IV

Directions (Q19–Q24): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: Subject to public order, morality and health, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to *profess, practise and propagate* religion. This protects the right to hold religious beliefs, to practise them by worship and observance, and to spread them.

The right is not absolute: it may be restricted in the interests of *public order, morality or health*. It does not protect any practice that is *not an essential part* of the religion, nor any *secular activity* merely because it is associated with religion. The State may make laws regulating economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, and may provide for social welfare and reform.

- Q19.** A citizen wishes to worship peacefully at home according to his faith. A State bars this for no reason of public order, morality or health. Applying the principle, is the bar valid?
- (A) Valid, because the State may regulate all worship.
 - (B) Invalid, because peaceful worship is protected and the State showed no ground of public order, morality or health.
 - (C) Valid, because worship even at home is dangerous.
 - (D) Invalid, because religion as a whole ought to be banned.
- Q20.** A religious practice involves a public act that seriously endangers public health during an epidemic, and the State restricts it on health grounds. Applying the principle, is the restriction valid?



- (A) Invalid, because all religious practice is absolute.
- (B) Invalid, because health is not a concern of the State.
- (C) Valid, because the right is subject to public order, morality and health, and the restriction is on health grounds.
- (D) Valid, because the State may ban any religion it wishes.

Q21. The State regulates the secular financial management of a temple's funds, leaving worship itself untouched. A trustee objects that this touches religion. Applying the principle, is it valid?

- (A) Invalid, because anything connected with a temple is religion.
- (B) Invalid, because a temple's funds are sacred.
- (C) Valid, because trustees have no say in the matter.
- (D) Valid, because the State may regulate the secular, financial activity associated with religious practice.

Q22. A person claims a right to propagate his religion by peaceful preaching, and the State stops the peaceful preaching for no valid reason. Applying the principle, is the ban valid?

- (A) Invalid, because the right freely to propagate religion protects peaceful preaching, and no valid ground was shown.
- (B) Valid, because preaching can be annoying.
- (C) Valid, because the State happens to dislike it.
- (D) Invalid, because only silent belief is ever allowed.

Q23. A custom associated with a religion is shown not to be an essential part of that religion, and the State regulates it for social reform. Applying the principle, is this valid?

- (A) Invalid, because every custom is protected.
- (B) Valid, because the right does not protect a practice that is not an essential part of the religion, and the State may provide for social reform.



- (C) Invalid, because a custom is untouchable.
- (D) Valid, because customs are meaningless anyway.

Q24. A religious ceremony is entirely peaceful, harms no one, and raises no issue of public order, morality or health, but the State bans it purely because officials dislike that religion. Applying the principle, is the ban valid?

- (A) Valid, because officials may choose what to allow.
- (B) Valid, because the ceremony is an unusual one.
- (C) Invalid, because a peaceful ceremony raising no issue of public order, morality or health cannot be banned merely out of dislike for the religion.
- (D) Invalid, because ceremonies must always be allowed to continue.

Passage V

Directions (Q25–Q30): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: A person may be liable in negligence for causing another not physical injury by impact, but *nervous shock*, that is, a recognised psychiatric illness brought about by what the person perceived. Liability arises only where such harm to the claimant was *reasonably foreseeable*.

It is generally foreseeable where the claimant was within the *range of physical danger*, or where the claimant, being *closely and lovingly bonded* to a victim, with his own eyes or ears directly perceived the accident or its *immediate aftermath*. Mere grief or sorrow, without a recognised psychiatric illness, is not enough. A person who suffers shock merely from being casually told of an event by a third party, long afterwards, and who is a stranger to the victim, generally cannot recover.

Q25. A, standing right beside a road, narrowly escapes being hit by B's negligently driven car and, from the terror of the near miss, develops a recognised psychiatric illness. Applying the principle, is B liable?

- (A) No, because A was not actually hit by the car.
- (B) Yes, because A was within the range of physical danger and foreseeably suffered a recognised psychiatric illness.



- (C) No, because only bodily injury counts.
- (D) Yes, but only if A was also cut or bruised.

Q26. C, a loving mother, with her own eyes sees her child struck by D's negligent driving right in front of her, and develops a recognised psychiatric illness. Applying the principle, is D liable?

- (A) Yes, because C, closely bonded to her child, directly saw the accident and foreseeably suffered a recognised psychiatric illness.
- (B) No, because C herself was not in any danger.
- (C) No, because she was only a witness to it.
- (D) Yes, but only if C fainted at once.

Q27. E, a total stranger to the victim, is casually told by a passer-by, weeks later, about an accident, and claims to have suffered shock. Applying the principle, is there liability?

- (A) Yes, because E felt shocked.
- (B) Yes, because any shock at all counts.
- (C) No, because E was a stranger merely told of the event by another, long afterwards, so the harm was not foreseeable.
- (D) No, because strangers can never feel anything.

Q28. F, closely bonded to the victim, arrives moments after the crash and directly sees the immediate, horrifying aftermath, developing a recognised psychiatric illness. Applying the principle, is there liability?

- (A) No, because F did not see the crash itself.
- (B) No, because F arrived a little too late.
- (C) Yes, but only if F was also in the crash.
- (D) Yes, because F, closely bonded to the victim, directly perceived the immediate aftermath and foreseeably suffered a recognised psychiatric illness.



- Q29.** G merely feels ordinary grief and sadness at a loss but develops no recognised psychiatric illness. Applying the principle, can G recover for nervous shock?
- (A) Yes, because G is genuinely sad.
 - (B) No, because mere grief or sorrow, without a recognised psychiatric illness, is not enough.
 - (C) Yes, because sorrow is itself a harm.
 - (D) No, because only wealthy persons may claim.
- Q30.** H, standing safely far away and in no danger, with no close bond to anyone involved, suffers a recognised illness only because the distant scene was unpleasant to look at. Applying the principle, is his harm reasonably foreseeable so as to give liability?
- (A) Yes, because H saw something unpleasant.
 - (B) Yes, because H became unwell.
 - (C) No, because H was neither within the range of danger nor closely bonded to a victim, so his harm was not reasonably foreseeable.
 - (D) Yes, but only if H reported the scene to the police.



Detailed Solutions

Q1.

Solution

Principle applied: Where both the defendant's negligence and the claimant's own carelessness cause the harm, damages are reduced in proportion, not wholly barred.

Application to the facts: A was negligent in hitting B. B was also careless in crossing without looking. Both faults contributed to the harm. So B's damages are reduced in proportion to his share, but he is not wholly barred.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Contributory negligence reduces, it does not wholly bar, recovery.
- Option C: B's own carelessness means he cannot recover in full.
- Option D: A remains liable for his share; B's carelessness does not free A entirely.

Final Answer: Damages reduced in proportion to B's fault ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q1](#)

Q2.

Solution

Principle applied: If the claimant took all reasonable care for his own safety, there is no contributory negligence.

Application to the facts: C crossed at the signal with the walk sign on. He took all reasonable care for his own safety. The harm came only from D's negligence. So there is no contributory negligence and C's damages are not reduced.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Merely being on the road, while taking care, is not carelessness.
- Option B: Pedestrians are not "always" at fault.
- Option D: The reason is C's own care, not any claim that drivers are never at fault.

Final Answer: Reasonable care taken, no contributory negligence ⇒ **C**

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q2](#)



Q3.

Solution

Principle applied: A reasonable but imperfect choice made in the agony of the moment, faced with a danger created by another, is not contributory negligence.

Application to the facts: F's negligence created a sudden danger to E. E had only an instant to react. He made a reasonable, though imperfect, choice in that agony of the moment. So it is not contributory negligence.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A wrong split-second choice under sudden danger is not carelessness.
- Option B: With no time to weigh options, jumping the "wrong" way is excusable.
- Option C: The reason is the agony of the moment, not that E can "never" be responsible.

Final Answer: Agony-of-the-moment choice is not contributory negligence ⇒

[Go Back to Q3](#)

Q4.

Solution

Principle applied: Where the claimant's own carelessness increases his harm, his damages are reduced to that extent.

Application to the facts: H's negligence caused the accident. But G's own failure to wear a helmet made his head injury worse. G's carelessness contributed to the extent of that injury. So his damages are reduced to the extent his own failure contributed.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Contributory negligence reduces damages, it does not wipe them out.
- Option C: Because his own carelessness added to the injury, he cannot recover in full.
- Option D: H remains liable for the accident he caused.

Final Answer: Damages reduced to the extent of G's own carelessness ⇒

[Go Back to Q4](#)



Q5.

Solution

Principle applied: If the claimant took all reasonable care, there is no contributory negligence and his damages are not reduced.

Application to the facts: I took every reasonable precaution. The harm arose purely from J's negligence. I contributed no carelessness of his own. So his damages are not reduced.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: There is no automatic halving; reduction needs the claimant's own fault.
- Option C: Not "everyone always" shares fault; here I was careful.
- Option D: A careful pedestrian can certainly claim.

Final Answer: No carelessness by I, damages not reduced ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q5](#)

Q6.

Solution

Principle applied: Where the claimant's own carelessness also contributed to the harm, his damages are reduced in proportion.

Application to the facts: K carelessly ignored clear barriers and warnings on a live worksite. L was also negligent there. Both faults contributed to K's harm. So K's damages are reduced in proportion to his own share, not wholly barred.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: K cannot recover in full given his own carelessness.
- Option B: Contributory negligence reduces, it does not wholly bar, recovery.
- Option D: L is not freed of liability for his own negligence.

Final Answer: Shared fault, damages reduced in proportion ⇒ **C**

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q6](#)



Q7.

Solution

Principle applied: Using a relation of trust to obtain an unfair advantage is undue influence.

Application to the facts: The guru was completely trusted by his elderly devotee, a relation of trust. He used that position to get most of D's property on unfair terms. That is a use of dominance to gain an unfair advantage. So it is undue influence.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: A willing signature obtained through a dominating trust relation is exactly what undue influence targets.
- Option C: A gift is not "always valid" when procured by undue influence.
- Option D: Undue influence does not require force at knifepoint; that would be coercion.

Final Answer: Trust relation used for unfair advantage \Rightarrow

[Go Back to Q7](#)

Q8.

Solution

Principle applied: Contracting with a person whose capacity is affected by illness or distress, to gain an unfair advantage, is undue influence.

Application to the facts: P was seriously ill and distressed, his capacity weakened. The doctor was in a position to dominate P's will. He used it to get valuable assets far below their worth, an unfair advantage. So it is undue influence.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: A gravely weak, distressed patient is precisely one whose will can be dominated.
- Option C: The honesty of doctors in general does not answer these facts.
- Option D: A threat is not required; undue influence turns on domination, not force.

Final Answer: Domination of a weakened patient for unfair gain \Rightarrow

[Go Back to Q8](#)



Q9.

Solution

Principle applied: A mere hard bargain, with no domination of the will, is not undue influence.

Application to the facts: The two businessmen were of equal standing. Neither was in a position to dominate the other's will. The deal was merely a hard bargain that one now regrets. Without domination, there is no undue influence.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A poor deal is not undue influence absent domination.
- Option B: Regret does not create undue influence.
- Option D: The reason is the lack of domination, not any bar on businessmen complaining.

Final Answer: Hard bargain without domination is not undue influence ⇒

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q9](#)

Q10.

Solution

Principle applied: Once domination and an unfair transaction are shown, the burden shifts to the dominant party.

Application to the facts: Domination and an unfair transaction have been shown. The principle then places the burden on the dominant party. He must prove the contract was not induced by undue influence. So the dominant party bears that burden.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The burden shifts away from the dominated party once domination is shown.
- Option B: Someone must prove it; the principle assigns that to the dominant party.
- Option C: It is not for the court to prove the fact; the dominant party must.

Final Answer: Burden on the dominant party ⇒

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q10](#)



Q11.

Solution

Principle applied: Real authority used to obtain an unfair advantage is undue influence, making the contract voidable at the dominated party's option.

Application to the facts: The employer held real authority over a junior, dependent employee. He used that authority to press the employee into an unfair loan on harsh terms. That is domination used for an unfair advantage. So it is undue influence and the contract is voidable at the employee's option.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The employee's agreement, obtained by dominance, is exactly what undue influence covers.
- Option C: A duty to obey does not license an unfair, dominated loan.
- Option D: Undue influence does not require that the employee be dismissed.

Final Answer: Authority used for unfair advantage; voidable ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q11](#)

Q12.

Solution

Principle applied: Without domination of the will, there is no undue influence, whatever the relationship.

Application to the facts: The son was of full capacity and free mind, under no domination. The sale was at a fair price. He simply changed his mind afterwards. With no domination of his will, there is no undue influence.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A family tie alone does not prove domination.
- Option B: A change of mind is not undue influence.
- Option C: Even a fair price is not the key point; the key is the absence of domination.

Final Answer: No domination of the will ⇒ **D**

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q12](#)



Q13.

Solution

Principle applied: Where a criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is liable as if he did it alone.

Application to the facts: A, B and C planned the robbery together, sharing a common intention. The killing of the guard happened during and in furtherance of that plan. A and C participated by holding the guard down. So they are liable for the killing in the same manner as B.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Each participant need not strike the fatal blow to be liable.
- Option C: The shared plan makes the participants liable.
- Option D: A killing in furtherance of the common intention is attributed to all, not just robbery.

Final Answer: All liable for an act in furtherance of common intention ⇒

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q13](#)

Q14.

Solution

Principle applied: Mere presence at the scene, without sharing the common intention, does not create liability.

Application to the facts: D was only standing in the street. He shared no plan and took no part in the fight. Presence alone, with no shared intention, is not enough. So D is not liable under common intention.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Being present is not participation in a shared intention.
- Option B: A failure to intervene does not create common-intention liability.
- Option D: Bystanders are not automatically responsible for what unfolds.

Final Answer: Mere presence, no shared intention ⇒

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q14](#)



Q15.

Solution

Principle applied: A common intention may develop even on the spot, so long as it is shared and acted upon together.

Application to the facts: E and F, on the spot, suddenly formed a shared intention to beat G. They then beat him together. A common intention can arise on the spot, not only from advance planning. So both share the liability.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A prior plan is not required; on-the-spot common intention suffices.
- Option B: Common intention need not be formed days earlier.
- Option C: No written agreement is needed for a shared intention.

Final Answer: Common intention may form on the spot ⇒

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q15](#)

Q16.

Solution

Principle applied: A merely similar or parallel intention, held independently by each, is not a shared common intention.

Application to the facts: H and I did not know each other. Each picked the pockets acting entirely on his own. Their intentions were similar but independent, not shared. So there is no common intention.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Robbing the same person, independently, does not make the intention shared.
- Option C: Acting at the same moment is coincidence, not a meeting of minds.
- Option D: The seriousness of the offence is irrelevant; the flaw is the lack of a shared intention.

Final Answer: Similar but independent, not shared ⇒

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q16](#)



Q17.

Solution

Principle applied: A participant who shares the common intention and takes part in furtherance of it is liable, though he did not do the same act.

Application to the facts: J and K shared a plan to assault L. K held L down while J beat him. K participated in furtherance of the shared intention, though he struck no blow. So K is liable as if he beat L.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A participant need not personally strike to be liable.
- Option B: Not only the one who beats is liable; all who share and further the intention are.
- Option D: K's holding L down is enough; he need not also strike a blow.

Final Answer: Shared intention plus participation ⇒ C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q17](#)

Q18.

Solution

Principle applied: A participant is not liable for a wholly different act, outside the shared common intention, done by another on his own.

Application to the facts: M and N shared only an intention to frighten O with sticks. There was no plan to kill. N, on his own, pulled a hidden gun and shot O, a wholly different act outside the shared plan. So M is not liable for the shooting under their common intention.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Being present with N does not extend to N's independent, different act.
- Option C: Carrying sticks to frighten is not a shared intention to shoot.
- Option D: The intention to frighten does not cover a killing outside the plan.

Final Answer: Act outside the shared common intention ⇒ B

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q18](#)



Q19.

Solution

Principle applied: Peaceful worship is protected, and may be restricted only in the interests of public order, morality or health.

Application to the facts: The citizen wished only to worship peacefully at home. That is a protected practice of religion. The State showed no ground of public order, morality or health. So the bar is invalid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The State may regulate on the listed grounds, none of which was shown here.
- Option C: Peaceful home worship is not shown to endanger anything.
- Option D: The flaw is the missing ground, not any idea that religion should be banned.

Final Answer: Protected worship, no valid ground shown ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q19](#)

Q20.

Solution

Principle applied: The right to practise religion is subject to public order, morality and health.

Application to the facts: The public act seriously endangered public health during an epidemic. Health is one of the grounds to which the right is subject. The State restricted the practice on that health ground. So the restriction is valid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The right is not absolute; it yields to health.
- Option B: Public health is a legitimate State concern under the principle.
- Option D: The State may not “ban any religion”; here it validly restricts on health grounds.

Final Answer: Restriction on the health ground is valid ⇒ **C**

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q20](#)



Q21.

Solution

Principle applied: The State may regulate the secular, financial activity associated with religious practice.

Application to the facts: The State regulated only the secular financial management of the temple's funds. Worship itself was left untouched. Financial management is a secular activity associated with religion. So the regulation is valid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Not everything connected with a temple is protected religion; secular finance may be regulated.
- Option B: Treating funds as beyond all regulation is wrong; their management is secular.
- Option C: The validity rests on the secular nature of the activity, not on trustees having “no say”.

Final Answer: Secular financial activity may be regulated ⇒ D

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q21](#)

Q22.

Solution

Principle applied: The right freely to propagate religion protects peaceful preaching, restrictable only on the listed grounds.

Application to the facts: The person wished only to propagate his religion by peaceful preaching. Propagation is expressly protected. The State stopped it for no valid ground of public order, morality or health. So the ban is invalid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Preaching being “annoying” is not a listed ground.
- Option C: Official dislike is not a valid ground for a ban.
- Option D: The right covers profession, practice and propagation, not silent belief alone.

Final Answer: Peaceful propagation protected, no valid ground ⇒ A

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q22](#)



Q23.

Solution

Principle applied: The right does not protect a practice that is not essential to the religion, and the State may provide for social reform.

Application to the facts: The custom is shown not to be an essential part of the religion. Such a non-essential practice is not protected. The State regulated it for social reform, which is expressly allowed. So the regulation is valid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Not every custom is protected; only essential religious practices are.
- Option C: A non-essential custom is not “untouchable”.
- Option D: The validity rests on the non-essential nature and social reform, not on customs being “meaningless”.

Final Answer: Non-essential practice, social reform permitted ⇒ B

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q23](#)

Q24.

Solution

Principle applied: A peaceful practice raising no issue of public order, morality or health may not be banned merely out of dislike.

Application to the facts: The ceremony was entirely peaceful and harmed no one. It raised no issue of public order, morality or health. The State banned it purely because officials disliked the religion. Dislike is not a listed ground, so the ban is invalid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Officials may not simply “choose” to ban a peaceful ceremony.
- Option B: A ceremony being unusual is not a ground for a ban.
- Option D: The reason it stands is the absence of any valid ground, not that ceremonies “must always continue”.

Final Answer: No valid ground; dislike is not enough ⇒ C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q24](#)



Q25.

Solution

Principle applied: A claimant within the range of physical danger who foreseeably suffers a recognised psychiatric illness may recover for nervous shock.

Application to the facts: A was right beside the road and narrowly escaped being hit. He was within the range of physical danger. From the terror he developed a recognised psychiatric illness. Such harm was reasonably foreseeable, so B is liable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Actual impact is not required; being within the range of danger suffices.
- Option C: Nervous shock, a recognised psychiatric illness, is compensable, not only bodily injury.
- Option D: No cut or bruise is needed where the illness is a recognised one.

Final Answer: Within the range of danger, foreseeable illness ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q25](#)

Q26.

Solution

Principle applied: A person closely bonded to a victim who directly perceives the accident may recover for a foreseeable recognised psychiatric illness.

Application to the facts: C is the child's mother, closely and lovingly bonded. She saw the accident directly, with her own eyes. She developed a recognised psychiatric illness. Such harm was foreseeable, so D is liable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: A close relative who directly perceives the accident may recover though not in danger herself.
- Option C: She is not a mere stranger-witness; her close bond and direct sight bring her within the principle.
- Option D: Recovery does not depend on her fainting.

Final Answer: Close bond and direct perception ⇒ **A**

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q26](#)



Q27.

Solution

Principle applied: A stranger merely told of an event by another, long afterwards, generally cannot recover, as the harm is not foreseeable.

Application to the facts: E was a total stranger to the victim. He learned of the accident only by being casually told, weeks later. He neither was in danger nor directly perceived anything. So his harm was not foreseeable and there is no liability.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Feeling shocked is not enough without foreseeability.
- Option B: Not “any shock at all” counts; the harm must be foreseeable.
- Option D: The reason is the lack of foreseeability, not that strangers “feel nothing”.

Final Answer: Stranger, told later; not foreseeable ⇒ C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q27](#)

Q28.

Solution

Principle applied: A closely bonded person who directly perceives the immediate aftermath may recover for a foreseeable recognised psychiatric illness.

Application to the facts: F was closely bonded to the victim. He arrived moments after and directly saw the immediate, horrifying aftermath. He developed a recognised psychiatric illness. The principle covers the immediate aftermath, so there is liability.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Seeing the immediate aftermath is enough; seeing the crash itself is not required.
- Option B: Arriving moments after, to the immediate aftermath, is within the principle.
- Option C: F need not have been in the crash to recover.

Final Answer: Close bond, direct perception of the immediate aftermath ⇒ D

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q28](#)



Q29.

Solution

Principle applied: Mere grief or sorrow, without a recognised psychiatric illness, is not enough for nervous shock.

Application to the facts: G felt only ordinary grief and sadness. He developed no recognised psychiatric illness. The principle requires a recognised illness, not mere sorrow. So G cannot recover.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Sadness alone is not the recognised illness the principle requires.
- Option C: Ordinary sorrow is not compensable as nervous shock.
- Option D: The reason is the absence of a recognised illness, not wealth.

Final Answer: Mere grief, no recognised illness \Rightarrow **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q29](#)

Q30.

Solution

Principle applied: Where the claimant was neither within the range of danger nor closely bonded to a victim, his harm is generally not reasonably foreseeable.

Application to the facts: H stood safely far away, in no danger. He had no close bond to anyone involved. He was upset only because the distant scene was unpleasant. Such harm was not reasonably foreseeable, so there is no liability.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Seeing something unpleasant from safety does not make the harm foreseeable.
- Option B: Becoming unwell is not enough without foreseeability.
- Option D: Reporting the scene has nothing to do with liability.

Final Answer: Neither in danger nor closely bonded; not foreseeable \Rightarrow **C**

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q30](#)



Answer Key

Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans
1	B	2	C	3	D	4	A	5	B
6	C	7	A	8	A	9	C	10	D
11	B	12	D	13	A	14	C	15	D
16	A	17	C	18	B	19	B	20	C
21	D	22	A	23	B	24	C	25	B
26	A	27	C	28	D	29	B	30	C

