

CLAT Legal Reasoning

Sample Paper – 6

Duration: 30 Minutes

Maximum Marks: 30

Instructions

- This paper contains **30** Multiple Choice Questions (Single Correct Answer), modelled on the Legal Reasoning section of **CLAT** (Common Law Admission Test).
- Each correct answer carries **+1 mark**. There is a **negative marking of 0.25 marks** for every incorrect answer; unattempted questions carry no penalty.
- The paper has **five passages**, each stating one or more **legal principles** and followed by **six** questions. Apply **only** the principle(s) given in the passage to the facts; do not rely on any outside knowledge of the law.
- CLAT is an offline pen-and-paper (OMR) test with no sectional time limit; attempt this practice paper in one timed sitting of about **30 minutes**.
- Use of mobile phones, calculators, dictionaries, or electronic gadgets is strictly prohibited.

Passage I

Directions (Q1–Q6): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: An enterprise engaged in a *hazardous or inherently dangerous activity*, which causes harm to anyone by the escape of a dangerous substance from that activity, is *absolutely liable* to compensate all those harmed.

This liability is stricter than ordinary strict liability: it is *not subject to any of the usual exceptions*, such as the act of a stranger, an act of God, or the plaintiff's consent. The enterprise cannot escape by showing that it took all reasonable care, or that the harm was caused by an event beyond its control. The rule rests on the idea that an enter-



prise carrying on a dangerous activity for profit must bear the full cost of the harm it causes. The compensation may be large enough to have a *deterrent* effect, keeping in view the capacity of the enterprise. The rule applies only to enterprises engaged in such a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity.

- Q1.** A chemical factory carrying on a hazardous activity leaks poisonous gas that harms nearby residents, though the factory proves it took all reasonable care. Applying the principle, is it liable?
- (A) Yes, because an enterprise in a hazardous activity is absolutely liable for harm from an escape, and taking care is no defence.
 - (B) No, because the factory took all reasonable care.
 - (C) No, because gas escapes are simply unavoidable.
 - (D) Yes, but only if the factory is shown to have been negligent.
- Q2.** A hazardous plant's toxic substance escapes and harms people, and the plant argues the escape was caused by an act of God, a freak natural event. Applying the principle, does that excuse it?
- (A) No, because absolute liability is not subject to the usual exceptions such as an act of God.
 - (B) Yes, because an act of God excuses it.
 - (C) Yes, because nature, not the plant, caused it.
 - (D) No, but only if a stranger was also involved.
- Q3.** A hazardous enterprise's dangerous chemical escapes because a stranger, over whom it had no control, tampered with it, harming residents. Applying the principle, is the enterprise excused?
- (A) Yes, because a stranger, not the enterprise, caused it.
 - (B) Yes, because the enterprise had no control over the stranger.
 - (C) No, but only because a plaintiff had consented.
 - (D) No, because absolute liability is not subject to the act-of-a-stranger exception.



- Q4.** In fixing compensation against a large, wealthy hazardous enterprise, applying the principle, may the amount be set large enough to have a deterrent effect, keeping in view its capacity?
- (A) Yes, the compensation may be large enough to deter, keeping in view the capacity of the enterprise.
 - (B) No, compensation must always be a tiny, token sum.
 - (C) No, the enterprise need pay nothing at all.
 - (D) Yes, but only if it is a very small firm.
- Q5.** A hazardous enterprise argues it should escape liability because the harm was caused by an event entirely beyond its control. Applying the principle, is it correct?
- (A) Yes, an event beyond its control excuses it.
 - (B) No, because under absolute liability the enterprise cannot escape by showing the harm was caused by an event beyond its control.
 - (C) Yes, because control is what matters most.
 - (D) No, but only if it was also negligent.
- Q6.** An ordinary bakery, which is not a hazardous activity, has a small kitchen mishap that injures a customer. Applying the principle, is the rule of absolute liability for hazardous enterprises the governing principle here?
- (A) Yes, absolute liability applies to every business alike.
 - (B) Yes, because a customer was in fact hurt.
 - (C) No, because absolute liability applies to enterprises engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, which an ordinary bakery is not.
 - (D) No, because a bakery can never cause harm.

Passage II

Directions (Q7–Q12): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.



Principle: Consent to an agreement is *free* when it is not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. *Fraud* means a false statement of fact made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, by a party to a contract, with intent to deceive the other and to induce him to enter the contract, and which does induce him.

Mere *silence* about facts is not fraud, unless there is a duty to speak, or unless the silence is itself equivalent to speech. A statement of mere *opinion*, honestly held, is not fraud. Where consent is caused by fraud, the contract is *voidable* at the option of the party deceived: he may avoid it, or insist that the contract be performed and that he be put in the position he would have been in if the representation had been true.

- Q7.** A knowingly tells B that a car has never been in an accident, which A knows is false, to make B buy it, and B buys it relying on this. Applying the principle, is this fraud?
- (A) No, because B ought to have checked the car himself.
 - (B) Yes, because A knowingly made a false statement of fact to deceive B and induce the purchase, and B relied on it.
 - (C) No, because cars often have accidents in any case.
 - (D) Yes, but only if the car later breaks down.
- Q8.** A honestly gives his genuine opinion that a painting is “probably worth a great deal”, which he truly believes at the time, and it turns out to be wrong. Applying the principle, is this fraud?
- (A) Yes, because the opinion turned out to be wrong.
 - (B) Yes, because B lost money relying on it.
 - (C) Yes, because the painting was overvalued.
 - (D) No, because a statement of mere opinion, honestly held, is not fraud.
- Q9.** A simply stays silent about a defect in goods. He is under no duty to speak, and his silence is not equivalent to speech. Applying the principle, is the mere silence fraud?
- (A) No, because mere silence about facts is not fraud unless there is a duty to speak or the silence is equivalent to speech.



- (B) Yes, because he did not reveal the defect.
- (C) Yes, because silence is always deceptive.
- (D) No, because goods are always sold just as they are seen.

Q10. A's consent to a contract was caused by C's fraud. A prefers to keep the contract but to be put in the position he would have been in had the false statement been true. Applying the principle, can he?

- (A) No, he can only walk away from the contract.
- (B) No, the contract is automatically void.
- (C) Only a court can decide what he may do.
- (D) Yes, because a party deceived by fraud may insist that the contract be performed and that he be put in the position he would have been in if the statement had been true.

Q11. A recklessly asserts, without any belief in its truth, that a plot of land has clear title, to induce D to buy, and D buys relying on it, and the assertion is false. Applying the principle, is this fraud?

- (A) No, because A was not certain either way.
- (B) Yes, because a false statement made recklessly, without belief in its truth, to induce D, who relied on it, is fraud.
- (C) No, because questions of land title are complicated.
- (D) Yes, but only if A made a profit from it.

Q12. A's fraud caused B's consent. B, fully aware of the fraud, freely chooses to affirm and keep the contract as it is. Applying the principle, can B do so?

- (A) No, because a contract caused by fraud is always void and dead.
- (B) No, because only a court can save such a contract.
- (C) Yes, because a contract caused by fraud is voidable at the option of the deceived party, and B may choose to affirm it.
- (D) Yes, but only if A returns any money first.



Passage III

Directions (Q13–Q18): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: Culpable homicide is *not* murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by *grave and sudden* provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation, or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident while so deprived.

For this exception to apply, the provocation must be both grave and sudden; it must actually deprive the offender of self-control; and the offender must act while still so deprived, *before the passion has had time to cool*. The exception does not apply where the provocation was *sought or voluntarily provoked* by the offender himself as an excuse for killing, nor where the act is done after the passion has cooled, nor where the provocation is given by something the offender was *lawfully entitled to do*.

- Q13.** Provoked by a sudden grave insult and slap from V, and while still deprived of self-control, A instantly kills V. Applying the principle, which is it?
- (A) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder, because A acted under grave and sudden provocation while deprived of self-control.
 - (B) Murder.
 - (C) No offence at all.
 - (D) An accident.
- Q14.** After a grave and sudden provocation, A goes home, waits two days planning coldly, and then kills the provoker. Applying the principle, does the exception apply?
- (A) Yes, the exception applies.
 - (B) Yes, because he had once been provoked.
 - (C) No, because the act was done after the passion had time to cool, so the exception does not apply.
 - (D) No offence at all.



- Q15.** A deliberately provokes V into insulting him, planning to use it as an excuse, and then kills V, claiming grave and sudden provocation. Applying the principle, does the exception apply?
- (A) Yes, because V did insult him.
 - (B) Yes, because he felt angry.
 - (C) No offence at all.
 - (D) No, because the provocation was voluntarily sought by A as an excuse for killing, so the exception does not apply.
- Q16.** While deprived of self-control by V's grave and sudden provocation, A strikes at V but by accident kills a bystander W standing nearby. Applying the principle, does the exception still apply to the death of W?
- (A) Yes, because the exception covers the death of another caused by mistake or accident while so deprived of self-control.
 - (B) No, because W did not provoke him.
 - (C) No, because only V's death could possibly qualify.
 - (D) Yes, but only if W was a relative of V.
- Q17.** A lawfully arrests V under a valid warrant. V, enraged by the lawful arrest, kills A, and then claims the arrest was grave and sudden provocation. Applying the principle, does the exception apply?
- (A) Yes, because being arrested is provoking.
 - (B) No, because the provocation was something, a lawful arrest, that A was lawfully entitled to do, so the exception does not apply.
 - (C) Yes, because V was genuinely angry.
 - (D) No offence at all.
- Q18.** A trivial, mild taunt, which is not grave, causes A, who was not truly deprived of self-control, to kill the taunter in cold calculation. Applying the principle, does the exception apply?
- (A) Yes, because any taunt at all counts.



- (B) Yes, because words were used against him.
- (C) No, because the provocation was neither grave nor did it actually deprive A of self-control, so the exception does not apply.
- (D) No offence at all.

Passage IV

Directions (Q19–Q24): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: Traffic in human beings and *begar* and other similar forms of *forced labour* are prohibited, and any contravention of this prohibition is an offence. Forced labour means compelling a person to work against his will, where the compulsion arises from force, threat, or economic circumstances that leave no real choice; making a person work without wages, or for a wage so low that it is not a real wage, is treated as forced labour. However, the State may impose *compulsory service for public purposes*, and in doing so it must not discriminate on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class. A person who *freely and voluntarily* agrees to work for a fair wage is not subjected to forced labour.

- Q19.** A landlord compels a poor labourer, by threats, to work without any wages and against his will. Applying the principle, is this forced labour prohibited by it?
- (A) No, because the labourer is poor in any case.
 - (B) Yes, because compelling a person to work against his will and without wages is forced labour, which is prohibited.
 - (C) No, because a landlord may set his own terms.
 - (D) Yes, but only if the labourer is a child.
- Q20.** The State requires citizens to render certain compulsory public service for a public purpose, applied without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste or class. Applying the principle, is this prohibited forced labour?
- (A) Yes, because all compulsion of any kind is banned.
 - (B) Yes, because service is still service.



- (C) Yes, because the citizens are being made to work.
- (D) No, because the State may impose compulsory service for public purposes, so long as it does not discriminate on the listed grounds.

Q21. A worker freely and voluntarily agrees to a job for a fair wage and works willingly. Applying the principle, is this forced labour?

- (A) Yes, because he does the work.
- (B) Yes, because all work is a form of compulsion.
- (C) Yes, because wages are involved.
- (D) No, because a person who freely and voluntarily works for a fair wage is not subjected to forced labour.

Q22. An employer, exploiting a person's desperate economic circumstances that leave no real choice, makes him work for a wage so low that it is not a real wage. Applying the principle, is this forced labour?

- (A) Yes, because compelling work through economic circumstances that leave no real choice, for a wage that is not a real wage, is forced labour.
- (B) No, because at least some wage was paid.
- (C) No, because the worker could have chosen to starve instead.
- (D) Yes, but only if the employer used physical force.

Q23. A person is made to render begar, that is, forced labour without any payment, for a powerful local figure. Applying the principle, does it prohibit this?

- (A) No, because begar is an old custom.
- (B) No, because he was not physically beaten.
- (C) Yes, because begar, forced labour without payment, is expressly prohibited.
- (D) Yes, but only if he had complained about it.



- Q24.** The State, while imposing compulsory public service, singles out and burdens only persons of one particular caste. Applying the principle, is this valid?
- (A) Valid, because it is for a public purpose.
- (B) Invalid, because although the State may impose compulsory service, it must not discriminate on grounds only of caste, which it did here.
- (C) Valid, because caste is a convenient basis to use.
- (D) Invalid, because all public service of any kind is banned.

Passage V

Directions (Q25–Q30): Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow. In answering the questions, apply the principle stated in the passage even if it differs from the actual law, and do not use any knowledge of law you may otherwise have.

Principle: *Battery* is the intentional and direct application of force to the person of another, without lawful justification and without his consent, however slight the force. *Assault* is an act that intentionally causes another to reasonably apprehend the *immediate* infliction of such force upon him. Thus assault is the threat, and battery is the actual carrying out.

Mere *words alone*, without any act or gesture causing a reasonable apprehension of immediate force, do not amount to assault. There is no battery where the contact is one *generally accepted in the ordinary course of everyday life*, such as an unavoidable touch in a crowd. A threat of force that cannot possibly be carried out at that moment, so that no reasonable person would apprehend immediate force, is not assault.

- Q25.** A, without any justification or consent, deliberately strikes B on the face. Applying the principle, is this battery?
- (A) No, because it was only a single blow.
- (B) Yes, because A intentionally and directly applied force to B, without justification or consent.
- (C) No, because B was not seriously hurt.
- (D) Yes, but only if B fell down as a result.
- Q26.** A raises his fist and lunges at B as if to strike him at once, and B reasonably fears an immediate blow, though A does not actually hit him. Applying the principle, is this assault?



- (A) Yes, because A's act caused B to reasonably apprehend the immediate infliction of force, which is assault.
- (B) No, because A never actually touched B.
- (C) No, because no harm was in fact done.
- (D) Yes, but only if A was carrying a weapon.

Q27. A, standing far across a wide river with no possible way to reach B at that moment, shouts a threat to hit B. Applying the principle, is this assault?

- (A) Yes, because A did threaten B.
- (B) Yes, because any threat is frightening.
- (C) No, because the threatened force could not possibly be carried out at that moment, so no reasonable person would apprehend immediate force.
- (D) No, because rivers are dangerous in any case.

Q28. In a packed train, A is unavoidably jostled against B in the ordinary course of the crowd, with no intent to touch him. Applying the principle, is this battery?

- (A) Yes, because there was contact between them.
- (B) Yes, because B was touched at all.
- (C) Yes, because a train is a crowded place.
- (D) No, because a contact generally accepted in the ordinary course of everyday life, such as an unavoidable touch in a crowd, is not battery.

Q29. A merely speaks angry words to B, "I might hit you some day", with no act or gesture and no reasonable apprehension of immediate force. Applying the principle, is this assault?

- (A) Yes, because the words were threatening.
- (B) No, because mere words alone, without any act or gesture causing a reasonable apprehension of immediate force, are not assault.
- (C) Yes, because B felt uneasy about them.



(D) No, because words are always completely harmless.

Q30. A deliberately spits on B and flicks B's collar without consent, applying slight but intentional force to B's person. Applying the principle, is this battery?

(A) No, because the force used was very slight.

(B) No, because spitting and flicking do not count.

(C) Yes, because battery is the intentional and direct application of force to another without consent, however slight the force.

(D) Yes, but only if B was actually injured.



Detailed Solutions

Q1.

Solution

Principle applied: An enterprise in a hazardous activity is absolutely liable for harm from an escape, and taking care is no defence.

Application to the facts: The chemical factory carries on a hazardous activity. Poisonous gas escaped and harmed nearby residents. Under absolute liability the factory cannot escape by proving it took all reasonable care. So it is liable.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Taking care is no defence under absolute liability.
- Option C: The escape being “unavoidable” does not excuse a hazardous enterprise.
- Option D: Absolute liability does not require proof of negligence.

Final Answer: Absolute liability, care no defence ⇒

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q1](#)

Q2.

Solution

Principle applied: Absolute liability is not subject to the usual exceptions, including an act of God.

Application to the facts: The hazardous plant’s toxic substance escaped and harmed people. The plant pleads an act of God. Absolute liability, unlike ordinary strict liability, allows no such exception. So the plant is not excused.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: An act of God is one of the very exceptions absolute liability removes.
- Option C: That nature triggered it does not excuse a hazardous enterprise.
- Option D: No exception, whether stranger or act of God, applies.

Final Answer: No act-of-God exception under absolute liability ⇒

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q2](#)



Q3.

Solution

Principle applied: Absolute liability is not subject to the act-of-a-stranger exception.

Application to the facts: The dangerous chemical escaped because a stranger tampered with it. Under ordinary strict liability this might excuse the defendant. But absolute liability removes even the stranger exception. So the enterprise is not excused.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The stranger's act is not a defence under absolute liability.
- Option B: Lack of control over the stranger does not help under this stricter rule.
- Option C: The reason is not consent; it is that no exception applies.

Final Answer: No stranger exception under absolute liability ⇒

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q3](#)

Q4.

Solution

Principle applied: Compensation may be large enough to have a deterrent effect, keeping in view the capacity of the enterprise.

Application to the facts: The enterprise is large and wealthy. The principle expressly allows a deterrent measure of compensation. That measure keeps in view the capacity of the enterprise. So a large deterrent amount may be set.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Compensation is not required to be a tiny token sum.
- Option C: The enterprise is not free of paying.
- Option D: The deterrent measure is not confined to small firms; here it applies to a large one.

Final Answer: Deterrent compensation keyed to capacity ⇒

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q4](#)



Q5.

Solution

Principle applied: The enterprise cannot escape by showing the harm was caused by an event beyond its control.

Application to the facts: The enterprise pleads an event entirely beyond its control. Absolute liability expressly rejects this as a defence. The enterprise must bear the cost of the harm from its dangerous activity. So its argument fails.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: An event beyond control is not a defence here.
- Option C: Control is not what governs; the activity being hazardous is.
- Option D: Negligence need not be shown for absolute liability.

Final Answer: No escape for events beyond control \Rightarrow **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q5](#)

Q6.

Solution

Principle applied: Absolute liability applies only to enterprises engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity.

Application to the facts: An ordinary bakery is not engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. A small kitchen mishap is not the escape of a dangerous substance from such an activity. So the special rule of absolute liability does not govern here. The bakery is not caught by that rule.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Absolute liability does not apply to every business, only to hazardous ones.
- Option B: Injury to a customer alone does not invoke the hazardous-enterprise rule.
- Option D: A bakery can cause harm; the point is only that the absolute-liability rule does not apply.

Final Answer: Not a hazardous activity, so the rule does not apply \Rightarrow **C**

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q6](#)



Q7.

Solution

Principle applied: A knowing false statement of fact, made to deceive and induce a contract, which does induce it, is fraud.

Application to the facts: A stated the car had never been in an accident. A knew this was false. He said it to deceive B and induce the purchase. B relied on it and bought the car, so it is fraud.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: B's failure to check does not excuse A's deliberate lie.
- Option C: That cars often have accidents does not make A's specific false claim honest.
- Option D: Fraud is complete on the false statement inducing the contract, not on a later breakdown.

Final Answer: Knowing false statement inducing the contract ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q7](#)

Q8.

Solution

Principle applied: A statement of mere opinion, honestly held, is not fraud.

Application to the facts: A gave his genuine opinion that the painting was probably worth a great deal. He honestly believed it when he said it. An honestly held opinion is not a fraudulent statement of fact. So it is not fraud, even though it proved wrong.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: An opinion being wrong does not make it fraud.
- Option B: A loss suffered on an honest opinion is not fraud.
- Option C: Overvaluation in an honest opinion is not a false statement of fact.

Final Answer: Honest opinion is not fraud ⇒ **D**

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q8](#)



Q9.

Solution

Principle applied: Mere silence is not fraud unless there is a duty to speak or the silence is equivalent to speech.

Application to the facts: A merely stayed silent about a defect. He was under no duty to speak. His silence was not equivalent to speech. So the mere silence is not fraud.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Not revealing a defect, absent a duty, is not fraud.
- Option C: Silence is not “always” deceptive; it is fraud only in the stated situations.
- Option D: The reason is the absence of a duty to speak, not a rule that goods are always sold as seen.

Final Answer: Mere silence without a duty is not fraud ⇒

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q9](#)

Q10.

Solution

Principle applied: A party deceived by fraud may insist that the contract be performed and that he be placed as if the statement had been true.

Application to the facts: A's consent was caused by C's fraud. A does not wish to walk away. The principle lets the deceived party insist on performance, put in the position as if the representation were true. So A can do exactly that.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Avoiding the contract is only one option; insisting on performance is another.
- Option B: A fraud-induced contract is voidable, not automatically void.
- Option C: The choice is A's, not one that only a court may make.

Final Answer: Deceived party may insist on performance as if true ⇒

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q10](#)



Q11.

Solution

Principle applied: A false statement made recklessly, without belief in its truth, to induce a contract, which does induce it, is fraud.

Application to the facts: A asserted the land had clear title, recklessly and without any belief in its truth. He did so to induce D to buy. D relied on it and bought, and it was false. A reckless assertion of this kind is fraud.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Being “not certain” is exactly the reckless state the principle treats as fraud.
- Option C: The complexity of title does not excuse a reckless false assertion.
- Option D: Fraud does not depend on A actually profiting.

Final Answer: Reckless false assertion inducing the contract ⇒

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q11](#)

Q12.

Solution

Principle applied: A contract caused by fraud is voidable at the option of the deceived party, who may affirm it.

Application to the facts: A's fraud caused B's consent, making the contract voidable at B's option. Being voidable, it is not automatically dead. B, fully aware, freely chooses to keep it. So B may affirm the contract.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A fraud-induced contract is voidable, not automatically void.
- Option B: B can affirm it himself; no court is needed to save it.
- Option D: Affirmation is B's choice and does not depend on A returning money first.

Final Answer: Voidable at B's option; he may affirm ⇒

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q12](#)



Q13.

Solution

Principle applied: A killing under grave and sudden provocation, while deprived of self-control, is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Application to the facts: V suddenly gave A a grave insult and slap. A was thereby deprived of self-control. He killed V instantly, while still so deprived. So it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: The provocation exception takes it out of murder.
- Option C: It is not “no offence”; it remains culpable homicide.
- Option D: It was a deliberate blow under provocation, not an accident.

Final Answer: Grave and sudden provocation exception ⇒

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q13](#)

Q14.

Solution

Principle applied: The exception does not apply where the act is done after the passion has had time to cool.

Application to the facts: A was provoked, but then went home and waited two days. He planned the killing coldly over that time. The passion had long since cooled. So the exception does not apply.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: With the passion cooled and cold planning, the exception fails.
- Option B: Having once been provoked does not keep the exception alive after cooling.
- Option D: A deliberate killing is certainly an offence.

Final Answer: Passion had time to cool ⇒

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q14](#)



Q15.

Solution

Principle applied: The exception does not apply where the provocation was sought or voluntarily provoked as an excuse for killing.

Application to the facts: A deliberately provoked V into insulting him. He did so planning to use it as an excuse. He then killed V. Since the provocation was self-sought as an excuse, the exception does not apply.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: That V insulted him does not help when A engineered it.
- Option B: Anger arising from a self-sought provocation does not qualify.
- Option C: A deliberate killing is an offence.

Final Answer: Self-sought provocation as an excuse \Rightarrow D

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q15](#)

Q16.

Solution

Principle applied: The exception covers the death of another caused by mistake or accident while the offender is so deprived of self-control.

Application to the facts: A was deprived of self-control by V's grave and sudden provocation. While so deprived, he struck at V. By accident he killed a bystander, W. The exception expressly extends to such an accidental death of another, so it still applies.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: The exception does not require that W provoked him.
- Option C: It is not confined to the provoker's death; it covers accidental deaths of others too.
- Option D: It does not depend on W being V's relative.

Final Answer: Exception covers an accidental death of another \Rightarrow A

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q16](#)



Q17.

Solution

Principle applied: The exception does not apply where the provocation is something the offender was lawfully entitled to do.

Application to the facts: A lawfully arrested V under a valid warrant. A lawful arrest is something A was entitled to do. V's rage at that lawful act cannot be grave and sudden provocation within the exception. So the exception does not apply.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Being lawfully arrested is not qualifying provocation.
- Option C: V's genuine anger does not help when its cause was a lawful act.
- Option D: The killing is certainly an offence.

Final Answer: Provocation by a lawful act does not qualify ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q17](#)

Q18.

Solution

Principle applied: The exception requires the provocation to be grave and to actually deprive the offender of self-control.

Application to the facts: The taunt was trivial and mild, not grave. A was not truly deprived of self-control. He killed in cold calculation. With neither a grave provocation nor a real loss of self-control, the exception does not apply.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Not "any taunt" counts; it must be grave.
- Option B: Words that are merely mild are not grave provocation.
- Option D: A cold, calculated killing is an offence.

Final Answer: Neither grave nor actual loss of self-control ⇒ **C**

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q18](#)



Q19.

Solution

Principle applied: Compelling a person to work against his will and without wages is forced labour, which is prohibited.

Application to the facts: The landlord used threats to compel the labourer. The labourer was made to work against his will. He was given no wages at all. That is forced labour, which the principle prohibits.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The labourer's poverty does not permit forcing him to work unpaid.
- Option C: A landlord's freedom to set terms does not extend to forced, unpaid labour.
- Option D: Forced labour is prohibited whether or not the victim is a child.

Final Answer: Compulsion to work against will, unpaid ⇒ B

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q19](#)

Q20.

Solution

Principle applied: The State may impose compulsory service for public purposes, provided it does not discriminate on the listed grounds.

Application to the facts: The service is compulsory but for a public purpose. It is applied without discrimination on religion, race, caste or class. The principle expressly permits such compulsory public service. So it is not prohibited forced labour.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Not all compulsion is banned; compulsory public service is allowed.
- Option B: That it is "service" does not make lawful public service forced labour.
- Option C: Being made to work for a public purpose, without discrimination, is permitted.

Final Answer: Non-discriminatory compulsory public service is permitted ⇒ D

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q20](#)



Q21.

Solution

Principle applied: A person who freely and voluntarily works for a fair wage is not subjected to forced labour.

Application to the facts: The worker agreed to the job freely and voluntarily. The wage was a fair one. He works willingly. So this is not forced labour.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Merely doing work is not forced labour when it is voluntary.
- Option B: Not all work is compulsion; free, fair-wage work is not.
- Option C: The existence of wages does not make voluntary work forced.

Final Answer: Free, voluntary work for a fair wage ⇒

[Go Back to Q21](#)

Q22.

Solution

Principle applied: Compelling work through economic circumstances that leave no real choice, for a wage that is not a real wage, is forced labour.

Application to the facts: The employer exploited the person's desperate economic circumstances. Those circumstances left him no real choice. He was made to work for a wage so low it was not a real wage. That is forced labour under the principle.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: A wage that is not a real wage does not save it.
- Option C: The "choice" to starve is no real choice, which is exactly the compulsion described.
- Option D: Forced labour here does not require physical force; economic compulsion suffices.

Final Answer: Economic compulsion, wage not a real wage ⇒

[Go Back to Q22](#)



Q23.

Solution

Principle applied: Begar, forced labour without payment, is expressly prohibited.

Application to the facts: The person was made to render begar for a powerful local figure. Begar is forced labour without any payment. The principle expressly prohibits begar. So it is prohibited.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Being an old custom does not save begar from the prohibition.
- Option B: Forced labour need not involve a physical beating to be prohibited.
- Option D: The prohibition does not depend on the victim having complained.

Final Answer: Begar is expressly prohibited ⇒ C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q23](#)

Q24.

Solution

Principle applied: In imposing compulsory service, the State must not discriminate on grounds only of caste.

Application to the facts: The State imposed compulsory public service. It singled out and burdened only persons of one caste. Even permitted compulsory service must not discriminate on caste. So this imposition is invalid.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A public purpose does not cure discrimination on caste.
- Option C: Caste being “convenient” does not make its use lawful here.
- Option D: Public service is not entirely banned; the flaw is the caste discrimination.

Final Answer: Compulsory service must not discriminate on caste ⇒ B

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q24](#)



Q25.

Solution

Principle applied: Battery is the intentional and direct application of force to another without justification or consent.

Application to the facts: A deliberately struck B on the face. He had no lawful justification and no consent. Striking B is a direct application of force to his person. So it is battery.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A single blow is still an application of force.
- Option C: Battery does not require serious hurt; any force suffices.
- Option D: It does not depend on B falling down.

Final Answer: Intentional direct force without consent ⇒ **B**

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q25](#)

Q26.

Solution

Principle applied: Assault is an act that intentionally causes another to reasonably apprehend the immediate infliction of force.

Application to the facts: A raised his fist and lunged at B as if to strike at once. B reasonably feared an immediate blow. That reasonable apprehension of immediate force is the essence of assault. So it is assault, even though no blow landed.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option B: Assault does not require actual touching; the threat is enough.
- Option C: The absence of harm does not prevent an assault.
- Option D: It does not depend on A carrying a weapon.

Final Answer: Reasonable apprehension of immediate force ⇒ **A**

Answer: (A) [Go Back to Q26](#)



Q27.

Solution

Principle applied: A threat of force that cannot possibly be carried out at that moment is not assault.

Application to the facts: A was far across a wide river. He had no possible way to reach B at that moment. So no reasonable person would apprehend immediate force. The shouted threat is therefore not assault.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: A threat that cannot be immediately carried out is not assault.
- Option B: That a threat is frightening does not make it assault without apprehension of immediate force.
- Option D: The danger of rivers is irrelevant; the point is the impossibility of immediate force.

Final Answer: No possible immediate force, so no assault ⇒ C

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q27](#)

Q28.

Solution

Principle applied: A contact generally accepted in the ordinary course of everyday life, such as an unavoidable touch in a crowd, is not battery.

Application to the facts: In a packed train A was unavoidably jostled against B. This was in the ordinary course of the crowd. There was no intent to apply force. Such an everyday, unavoidable contact is not battery.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Mere contact in a crowd is the accepted, everyday kind that is not battery.
- Option B: Being touched in an ordinary crowd is not actionable force.
- Option C: The crowded nature of a train is precisely why the contact is accepted.

Final Answer: Ordinary everyday contact is not battery ⇒ D

Answer: (D) [Go Back to Q28](#)



Q29.

Solution

Principle applied: Mere words alone, without an act or gesture causing a reasonable apprehension of immediate force, are not assault.

Application to the facts: A only spoke angry words, “I might hit you some day”. There was no act or gesture with them. They caused no reasonable apprehension of immediate force. So there is no assault.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: Threatening words alone, without an act causing immediate apprehension, are not assault.
- Option C: B feeling uneasy is not the same as apprehending immediate force.
- Option D: The reason is the lack of immediate apprehension, not that words are “always harmless”.

Final Answer: Mere words, no immediate apprehension ⇒

Answer: (B) [Go Back to Q29](#)

Q30.

Solution

Principle applied: Battery is the intentional and direct application of force to another without consent, however slight the force.

Application to the facts: A deliberately spat on B and flicked B’s collar. He did so without B’s consent. Spitting on someone and flicking his collar are direct applications of force to his person. However slight, that is battery.

Why the other options are wrong:

- Option A: The force being slight does not prevent battery.
- Option B: Spitting on a person and flicking him are applications of force that do count.
- Option D: Battery does not require actual injury.

Final Answer: Intentional direct force, however slight ⇒

Answer: (C) [Go Back to Q30](#)



Answer Key

Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans
1	A	2	A	3	D	4	A	5	B
6	C	7	B	8	D	9	A	10	D
11	B	12	C	13	A	14	C	15	D
16	A	17	B	18	C	19	B	20	D
21	D	22	A	23	C	24	B	25	B
26	A	27	C	28	D	29	B	30	C

